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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
One purpose of this paper is to understand how such characteristics as
decentralized trading and spot delivery affect market price, quantity
traded, and buyer and seller surpluses. Another purpose is to test if the
market outcomes would become closer to those of the competitive equi-
librium if the decentralized spot market participants are provided with
additional information about market prices. A set of laboratory experi-
ments was designed to investigate these issues.
We have observed that decentralized trading is becoming more popular.
As an example, the Russian food system today can be characterized in
general as a decentralized market, where prices are discovered through
private bilateral negotiation. This is contrasted with centralized auction
trading in which price is discovered through the interaction of many buy-
ers and/or sellers. In a centralized auction market, all bids are made in
the presence of all potential traders and anyone may accept any bid. In
private negotiation, a single buyer and seller find each price bilaterally,
and third parties normally are unaware of the bids and trade prices.
Therefore, decentralized markets are much less information rich than
centralized methods of exchange.
There also is a "matching" problem in private negotiation trading that is
not present in auction trading. A bargaining pair may be unable to make
an efficient trade because the buyer values are lower than the seller
costs. At the same time, in the market there could exist other potential
trading partners with whom there could be more efficient trades, if the
matches were formed properly. In essence, there is less competition in
private negotiation trading as compared to auction trading.
Another important characteristic of the Russian food market is that the
final price in a contract is typically established at the time of delivery,
i.e., when the good is already produced (spot delivery). In this case the
producer faces an inventory loss risk. This risk is present because many
agricultural products are perishable, and if a producer is unable to sell
production, the production cost is lost.
Previous research suggests that the strong competitive nature of cen-
tralized markets allows sellers to be compensated for the inventory loss
risk by decreasing quantity produced. The market reacts and price in-
creases, as a result of the reduced quantity. In this paper we show that
market outcomes are different when advance production is combined
with decentralized trading. In the case of a finite number of possible
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trading matches, the inventory loss risk throws market power to the
buyer. Seller earnings are reduced in this market setting, as the price is
established at a level to cover the production cost, and the quantity sup-
plied to the market decreases. This is a source of market inefficiency.
It is a common point of view that both market efficiency and producer
earnings in decentralized trading could be increased through providing
agricultural producers more information about market prices. We studied
four information treatments in the laboratory private negotiation setting:
(1) agents had only market information which they learned by themselves
over the repeated trading cycles; (2) average price from trades in the
previous trading cycle was additionally provided to agents before a pro-
duction decision; (3) average price from the previous trading cycle of the
centralized market with the same supply and demand schedules was ad-
ditionally provided to agents before a production decision; and (4) price
was reported for all trades as they occurred during a trading cycle.
The experiment results suggest that providing additional information
about prices in a decentralized market with spot delivery, far from im-
proving sellers' earnings, tends to make them worse! Public information
seems to work more in favor of those who have stronger bargaining po-
sitions, i.e., in favor of buyers. Seller earnings in each of the treatments
with additionally provided market information were lower than in the
treatment when the agents had only information they learned by them-
selves.
In the paper we demonstrate that these results are to be expected.
Analyses of the laboratory data suggest that sellers adjusted their pro-
duction decision according to the additionally provided price information,
so that the reported price would be a little higher than their marginal
production cost. Besides, both sellers and buyers used the information
to form their price expectations in the trading cycles that followed. Buyer
market power resulted in reported prices being considered as the upper,
rather than average price, level in the trading cycles.
When market agents are provided with average price (which in the de-
centralized spot market tends to be near the monopsony level), a risk
averse seller reduces his/her production relative to the monopsony level
price, in order to avoid the situation in which the marginal unit has to be
sold at a loss. A buyer, however, maximizing his/her profit responds to
the quantity reduction by a further decrease in price (goes down the cost
schedule). As a result, less quantity is sold and for a lower price, hence,
seller earnings decrease.
On the other hand, when the reported prices are high (e.g., prices re-
ported from the competitive centralized market) and a producer re-
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sponds with increased production, the producer loses again. A buyer
does not have an incentive to buy the quantity that exceeds the optimum
monopsony level at a price that would cover the production costs be-
cause the buyer would not benefit from that decision. Instead, the buyer
uses his/her market power and forces the seller to accept a lower price.
The seller will do this because he/she would lose all production costs for
the extra units, if the lower price offered by the buyer was not accepted.
The producer-seller loses again. Thus, we conclude that the market
price information as provided in our experiments could hardly make pro-
ducers better off and, since quantity produced could be decreased,
market efficiency would be reduced.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The methods of exchange that evolve in the infant market economy of
Russia provide differing structures and price discovery mechanisms
through which individual choice is expressed (Yakunina et al., 1998). We
have observed in the Russian food system, as an example, the evolution
of such forms of coordination as vertical integration, business alliances,
and different contracts. Wholesale food markets have been established
in many regions. However, open centralized or auction trading of agri-
cultural products that is traditional in Western countries has not devel-
oped in Russia. In general, the Russian food system can be character-
ized as a more decentralized than centralized market. Price in a
decentralized market is not discovered through the interaction of many
buyers and sellers as in auction exchange. Instead, it is discovered pri-
marily through private, bilateral negotiation1. Private negotiation, includ-
ing barter, is becoming a common and important trading institution in
other countries as well. In the U.S. agriculture, for example, private ne-
gotiation trading is replacing auction trading.
In typical auction trading, exchange of an agricultural good usually re-
quires production before negotiation for price (so called spot delivery),
while contracts and private negotiations for price may often propose
production-to-demand (forward delivery). Forward contracting has the
potential of reducing a producer's risk of holding unsold units and can
guarantee the revenue of goods delivered in the future. Processors, by
forward contracting, also may reduce risk involving quality control and
the interrupted flow of inputs. Nevertheless, uncertainties currently faced
by Russian firms have resulted in terms of trade in a contract, particu-
larly price, being mostly established at the time of delivery. Forward and
spot trading, as two alternative methods of product delivery, influence
price discovery (Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier, 2001). It also is true
that the influence of delivery method on price discovery may be different
depending upon the trading institutions. Exchange institutions such as a
non-strategic, competitive market provide structure for individuals'
choices and thus will induce a collective behavior that differs notably
from the behavior of an arbitrary set of disjointed individuals (Crocker,
Shogren and Turner, 1998).
                                               
1 This was confirmed through interviews with businessmen in the food sector of
the Saratov region.
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An important aspect of a trading institution is the information it generates
for the participants. Centralized (auction) trading typically is character-
ized by offers and/or bids being made in the presence of all interested
parties and involved traders may accept or counter bids and offers. In
decentralized trading (private negotiation), each price is discovered
bilaterally by a single buyer and seller. The negotiation process is usually
conducted with little formality and information coming from the negotia-
tion process is restricted to the buyer and the seller. Third parties nor-
mally are unaware of the bids and trade prices (Buccola, 1985). There
are thus relatively severe restrictions on information dissemination in this
market institution, as compared to auctions. There also is a "matching"
problem in private negotiation trading that is not present in auction trad-
ing. A bargaining pair may be unable to trade or only make inefficient
trades because differences between buyer values and seller costs are
small or negative. In essence, there is less competition in private nego-
tiation trading as compared to auction trading. The institutional structure
of privately negotiated exchange likely impacts the outcome of the mar-
ket and its efficiency, and compared to an auction environment, it is less
efficient.2
The efficiency of decentralized trading could be improved by having gov-
ernment or/and private agencies gather transaction price information
and disseminate it among the market participants. In the U.S., as an ex-
ample, recent Mandatory Price Reporting legislation requires the par-
ticulars of large negotiated transactions to be made public. Besides, in a
country where open (centralized) markets exist, price information from
these markets can be used by those who transact through private nego-
tiations. Smith (1994), however, suggests that providing agents with
more information, far from improving market competitiveness, can make
it worse. Better-informed agents, perhaps through the provision of public
information, are unable to ignore such information, even when it is ad-
vantageous to do so. Some types of information in spot markets, as we
show in this paper, may increase the bargaining power of buyers as a
group. The information creates market power that reduces market effi-
ciency. This situation of more information not always being better for the
market has been referred to as the "curse of knowledge" (Camerer,
Loewenstein and Weber, 1989).
The purpose of this research is to investigate the impacts of alternative
market information scenarios on market outcomes when there is private
negotiation in spot delivery markets. Specifically, laboratory markets are
                                               
2 We consider a market as an efficient one if a sum of buyer and seller surpluses
is maximized given the relative demand and supply schedules.
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used to assess market outcomes (prices, trades, and earnings) in double
auction (centralized) and private negotiation (decentralized) trading. Al-
ternative market information scenarios include (1) no information other
than that which is naturally generated, then (2) average price from trades
in the previous production cycle is additionally provided, (3) average
price from the previous production cycle of the centralized (double auc-
tion) trading is additionally provided, and (4) price is reported for all
trades as they occur during a production cycle. Reporting all trade prices
as they occur is intended to more closely mimic an auction trading insti-
tution in which all trade prices are known to agents. The additional in-
formation treatments (2) – (4) assume that a number of bilateral nego-
tiations are taking place simultaneously in a trading cycle. We focus on
spot delivery, i.e. advance-production, because it dominates in agricul-
ture and in many business-to-business transactions in Russia.
2. ECONOMIC THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The simple competitive supply and demand analysis has been an effec-
tive means of predicting outcomes in auction markets. Agents, myopi-
cally acting to maximize gains through bids and/or offers, and unaware
of broader market forces, move toward total sales and an average price
that is established by the intersection of the market supply and demand
schedules. A double auction trading mechanism has been recognized by
experimentalists as the market type where the predictions of the com-
petitive model appear to be robust to a wide variety of supply and de-
mand configurations, to very harsh restrictions on the number of agents,
and to conditions regulating communications between sellers (Davis and
Holt, 1993, pp.167 – 168).
An important observation about double-auction markets is that complete
information regarding supply and demand arrays is not only unneces-
sary, but it may impede the convergence process (Smith, 1976, 1980).
Smith and Williams (1982) suggested that even though cost and value
information is private, the negotiating process is sufficiently symmetric
that participants tend to split the available surplus in initial contracts; and
the distribution of the actual surplus is affected by the relative theoretical
magnitudes of consumers' and producers' surpluses. The double auction
trading mechanism yields higher market efficiencies than institutions with
which it has been compared (Holt, 1995).
The competitive model has been a useful tool of analysis for both for-
ward and spot auction markets (see Appendix A1 for more formal con-
siderations). Spot delivery carries higher opportunity costs for the seller
PRICE DISCOVERY AND MARKET INFORMATION10
than for buyers , because inventory must be held and it may not be pos-
sible to hold inventories across production cycles. Hence leftover stocks
become a sunk cost. Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (2001) examined
pricing behavior for forward and spot deliveries where the trading institu-
tion was a double auction. Results suggest a tendency for prices in spot
markets to converge to a level 10% higher than prices in forward mar-
kets. Market forces take into account the added costs of advance pro-
duction in spot delivery, resulting in fewer trades and higher prices rela-
tive to forward delivery. Price and quantity traded in forward delivery with
auction trading are close to the predicted competitive equilibrium.
Is there such a theoretical framework that describes outcomes in pri-
vately negotiated trading? Suppose the method of trading repeatedly
matches a different buyer with a different seller, and allows them to se-
quentially trade units at possibly different prices for a set period of time.
Since one buyer confronts one seller in a transaction, bilateral market
power exists. Although indeterminate in its predictions of prices and
quantities, the simple textbook model of bilateral monopoly provides
some guidance for market outcomes in our spot delivery and forward
delivery experiments. Given a downward market demand and an upward
marginal cost schedule there are corresponding marginal revenue and
factor cost schedules. A monopoly seller restricts sales and seeks a high
price determined by the intersection of marginal revenue and marginal
cost. The monopsony buyer restricts sales and seeks a low price deter-
mined by the intersection of demand and the marginal factor cost
schedule. The model generally predicts a sales level less than the com-
petitive market level and a range of prices between the perfect monop-
sony level and the perfect monopoly level that bracket the competitive
prediction.
We argue that advance production or spot delivery in bilateral trading
throws market power to the buyer. Imagine sellers and buyers matched n
times in a single production cycle. At the beginning of the cycle, sellers
have made the output decision and inventory is in stock. The seller has
the opportunity to sell all stock during the n rounds of matches with buy-
ers in a production cycle. Inventory cannot be carried over to the next
production cycle, a characteristic of perishable products, which are
common in agriculture. Excess inventory thus becomes worthless at the
end of the nth negotiating round. In the last round the buyer has the in-
centive to bid and pay virtually zero for all stock. This price paid at the
end means that zero should be paid in the n – 1 round, then for n – 2,
and so on for all negotiating pairs. Through backward induction the pre-
dicted Nash equilibrium price therefore is zero for a single production
cycle. Sellers make losses in this scenario and will not produce in future
cycles; the market disappears.
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The buyer in a multi-period game seeks to maximize consumer surplus.
In principle the buyer can offer any price for units over a production cy-
cle; moving up the cost schedule until consumer surplus is maximized.
We shall assume there is no price discrimination and the buyer pays a
uniform price. The equilibrium price therefore, occurs, we know, where
marginal factor costs intersects the demand schedule. Price and quantity
sold are determined as if the buyer had perfect monopsony control of
the market. This is the multi-period Nash equilibrium. The result hinges
on advance production delivery. It gives the buyer bidding control. Pri-
vate negotiation with forward delivery restores bilateral control of the
market, giving more market power to the seller, and we would predict
higher prices.
Given spot delivery, can symmetric (market) information about past
trades transfer surplus to the seller and move the market toward the
competitive outcome? We believe the answer is no. Our reasoning goes
as follows. Suppose there is information that causes sellers to produce
more — they move up the market supply schedule. This has no impact
on the maximum surplus buyers can extract from the market. They have
no interest in buying the additional units, therefore leftover inventory in-
creases and seller earnings decline. Suppose there is information that
causes sellers to produce less. It may take time for buyers to adjust, but
they will pay less for fewer units, moving down the cost schedule, in or-
der to maximize their surplus, and seller earnings decline. Hence we ar-
gue that any information that makes sellers produce more or less in the
market will adversely impact their earnings.
In actual market trading like that constructed in our computer laborato-
ries, with several buyers and sellers, an individual agent faces a "match-
ing risk." Late random matches may pair a buyer with a seller where one
or the other may not gain from a trade. The traders cannot find a rea-
sonably positive difference between marginal value and marginal cost. If
there are n finite matches in a production cycle, valuable trading time is
wasted. Hence we believe that traders have an incentive to trade early in
a production cycle, and this may dilute some of the agent's market
power. Buyers, wishing to avoid a later mis-match, will move the price
above the monopsony level. Altogether, the impact of advance produc-
tion on prices in private negotiation is our empirical question, but we
have reason to believe that prices will be closer to the monopsony than
the monopoly level when there is advance production.
Experiments using decentralized or private negotiations have been less
common than double auctions (centralized trading) in the economics lit-
erature. Decentralized negotiations, in fact, were among the first experi-
ments conducted (Chamberlin, 1948). Chamberlin (1948) and Hong and
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Plott (1982) observed the excess-quantity outcome in experiments with
negotiated prices. Holt (1995) indicates that this result is suspect be-
cause Chamberlin's subjects had no financial motivation, and Hong and
Plott report only two sessions, conducted in the same week with the
same group of subjects. Moreover, in the experiments conducted by
Hong and Plott (1982) two parties engaged in negotiation via the tele-
phone. The telephone market provides a convenient means to conduct
private negotiation trading experiments but also contributes to reduced
control, because it is difficult to monitor each phone conversation. Buc-
cola (1985) studied pricing efficiency for forward delivery in double auc-
tion with multiple buyers and sellers and private negotiations trading. The
experiments were conducted orally, and in the private negotiation ex-
periment, just as in the auction market, transaction prices were written
on a chalkboard as soon as trades were made. Mean-squared error was
found to be lower in auction trading than in private negotiation trading,
suggesting auctions may be more information efficient. Buccola did not
consider the case when prices discovered in a private negotiation setting
were effectively proprietary and not reported to agents.
The issue of information dissemination has been studied in the context of
experimental asset markets (Sunder, 1995). These experiments proved
that dissemination and aggregation of information through the trading
mechanism alone (as opposed to conversations among traders, or news)
is possible, although it is not defensible to argue that rational expecta-
tions equilibria are achieved in all market environments. Another set of
asset market experiments were conducted to determine the effect of
market transparency (trade and quote disclosure) on price discovery,
bid-asks spreads, and market efficiency (Bloomfield and O'Hara, 1999;
Flood et al., 1999). These studies followed the theoretical analysis of Pa-
gano and Roell (1996) which predicted that transparency matters be-
cause patterns in trades, such as imbalances of buy or sell orders
across the market, may be more easily discerned in transparent markets.
This, in turn, allows market makers to learn any information from trades
more quickly, and thereby set their prices more efficiently.
Laboratory experiments, however, suggest that there is a trade-off be-
tween informational and transactional efficiency. Bloomfield and O'Hara
(1999) discovered that price errors decline more rapidly in the transpar-
ent markets, suggesting that transparent markets reveal information
more rapidly and completely than less transparent markets. This in-
creased efficiency is accompanied, however, by increases in opening
bid-ask spreads and, to some extent, later spreads as well, which appar-
ently is a result of reduced market-makers' incentives to compete for or-
der flow (greater transactional inefficiency). Note that the authors use
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the midpoint of the market bid and ask as a proxy for the market price in
each trading round. Therefore, given the higher bid-ask spread of the
transparent markets, even if the midpoint of the market bid and ask is
approached more rapidly, this does not necessarily mean that the bids
and asks themselves (actual prices) approach the true value more rap-
idly. The results of a similar experimental study conducted by Flood et al.
(1999) suggested that transparency involves lower spreads and less effi-
cient prices.
The above discussion yields the following propositions.
Proposition 1. Private negotiation trading will restrict sales relative to
the competitively determined equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In private negotiation trading, price will range between
the pure monopoly and pure monopsony level. For the forward delivery,
price will be close to the competitively determined equilibrium; for the
spot delivery, price will be closer to the monospony level, thus, it will be
reduced relative to the forward price.
Proposition 3. Providing agents with additional information about aver-
age market price from previous trade cycle or prices of all trades as they
occur during a production cycle will not increase quantity traded and/or
price for the spot delivery in private negotiation trading. Hence, the addi-
tional price information will not result in a higher efficiency in the private
negotiation spot market.
3. LABORATORY MARKETS AND PROCEDURES
Laboratory experimental economics (Plott, 1982; Smith, 1982) was used
to obtain data for the analyses. This approach is warranted because data
from private negotiations are proprietary and unavailable. A laboratory
method is particularly useful to study markets in Russia, where market
data may not be available or accurate. This method also allows us to re-
duce the confounding influence of the myriad of variables present in
naturally occurring markets. Laboratory markets provide for a controlled
environment. By using a sufficiently simple framework, the effects re-
sulting from a change in the trading institution, or other variable, can be
isolated.
3.1. Basic Design
All trading was conducted over a computer network. Consistent with pre-
vious studies (e.g., Krogmeier, 1996), an experimental session consisted
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of 15 four and one-half-minute trading cycles. As in Noussair, Plott, and
Riezman (1995) and Mestelman and Welland (1987) four buyers and four
sellers participated in each laboratory market session.
Reservation values, unit costs, and earnings were denoted on a mone-
tarily convertible currency called tokens to accommodate changes in in-
flation and to facilitate comparison of results. The exchange rate used in
the experiments was 35 tokens = 1 ruble. At the beginning of each ses-
sion, each participant was given an initial token balance (700 tokens).3
Participants were told that they were free to keep this money plus any
they earned from trading.
Buyers were privately given a table that listed the maximum reservation
(resale) values for each unit purchased. Sellers were similarly provided
with unit costs. Unit values and unit costs were identical for each buyer
and each seller, respectively. Unit values and unit costs used in the ex-
periments are reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Unit Values and Unit Costs (tokens).
Unit(s)
Unit Values
(Buyers)
Unit Costs
(Sellers)
1 130 30
2 120 40
3 110 50
4 100 60
5 90 70
6 80 80
7 70 90
8 60 100
Each buyer was allowed to purchase, one at a time, up to eight units
during each trading period. The first unit purchased in each period was
                                               
3 This initial balance was deemed necessary in our spot market experiments,
since sellers must incur production costs prior to being given the opportunity to
earn profit from sales. An additional concern is that the initial endowment be large
enough to preclude the possibility of individual bankruptcy early in the session,
particularly for sellers. In order that symmetry between buyers and sellers be
maintained, the initial balance will be given to both buyers and sellers.
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the highest value unit, the second purchased was the second highest
value unit, and so on. Likewise, each seller was allowed to produce up to
eight units and to sell produced units, one at a time, in each trading pe-
riod. The first unit produced (sold) was the lowest cost unit, the second
unit was the second lowest cost unit, and so on.
Earnings for a buyer on each unit purchased were equal to the redemp-
tion value of the particular unit less the price paid to the seller. Earnings
for a seller on each unit sold were equal to the price received by the
seller less the production cost of the particular unit. Earnings were ac-
cumulated over the sequence of trading periods and were displayed on
the computer screen at the end of each trading period. At the end of the
experiment session, participants were paid the cash equivalent of their
earnings.
Buyers (sellers) were allowed at any time to submit bids (offers) for a
single unit. Bids (offers) were submitted by typing the numerical value
into the computer. The best bid (offer) was displayed on each individ-
ual's computer screen. Valid bids (offers) were made to follow an "im-
provement" rule, i.e., the bid (offer) to be displayed to the market was
required to be higher (lower) than that previously displayed as the best
bid (offer). As suggested by Davis and Holt (1993, p. 41), to add an im-
provement rule to the double auction is a common practice. Also, fol-
lowing common practice, a valid bid (offer) in our experiments was not
allowed to exceed (be lower) than the asking (bid) price currently dis-
played if one existed. A trade occurred when a best bid (offer) equaled
the best offer (bid).
The control treatments in this experiment are the forward and spot cen-
tralized markets — double auction trading institutions. Test treatments
are private negotiation (decentralized) forward and spot markets, without
and with additional price information (market price reports) in the latter.
Fig. 1 illustrates the design of the trading cycle for each treatment. A
practice session (Phase 1) was conducted after the instructions for the
experiment were presented to the participants and before the actual ex-
periment. At the end of every trading cycle, earnings were reported and
recorded by experiment participants (Phase 6). Sample instructions are
presented in Appendix A2. A new trading cycle then began. Each ex-
periment session lasted from 2.5 to 3 hours.
3.2. Spot versus Forward Delivery
The spot market involved Phases 1, 3, 4, and 6. Sellers made a produc-
tion decision, thereby providing units for sale in a centralized market or
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decentralized market. The production cost associated with these units
was incurred before trading began, reflecting the advance production
nature of a spot market. Sellers were allowed to sell only the number of
units they produced and there was no inventory carryover from one
trading period to the next.4 Buyers resell purchased units to the auction-
eer at predetermined prices to make a profit on each unit.5
Thus, sellers in the spot market face risk of inventory loss (not being
able to sell produced units and losing the cost of production) and, at the
same time, they face the risk of losing potential earnings if they do not
produce enough units. Buyers, however, face only the risk of losing po-
tential earnings if sellers do not produce enough units. Therefore, in the
spot experiment design sellers face higher risk. This higher seller risk,
we believe, is endogenous in the case of a spot delivery. Notice, that in
our design both sellers and buyers have zero fixed cost6. If sellers
and/or buyers had a positive fixed cost, they would face the additional
risk of not being able to earn profits large enough to cover the fixed
cost. In our simplified design with zero fixed cost, sellers and buyers are
                                               
4 This is characteristic of perishable commodities that are common in agricul-
tural/food markets.
5 There is no intermediary allowed.
6 In fact, both buyers and sellers act like intermediaries in our experiments.
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in the same position before sellers produce units. But as soon as a seller
has produced units, the relative production costs become sunk costs,
and the seller's bargaining position is affected.
The forward market treatments involved Phases 1, 2, 3, and 6. In this
case, trading occurs before a production decision is made. Sellers were
required to produce as many units as they had sold in the forward trad-
ing and buyers are required to purchase those units. Thus, there is no
inventory loss risk in this setting. The forward market treatments were
conducted to better understand the effects of spot delivery in both cen-
tralized and decentralized markets.
3.3. Decentralized versus Centralized Trading
Both centralized and decentralized markets could be modeled in a labo-
ratory setting in different ways. The main feature of a centralized market
that we emphasize in this study is that all bids are offered in the pres-
ence of all potential traders and anyone may accept any bid. Some cen-
tralized markets utilize an asymmetric trading institution as in English,
Dutch, or sealed bid auctions. However, in this study we use a symmetric
double auction institution because of its frequent use and also because
of its ability to generate competitive equilibrium results in a laboratory
setting. Relying on induced value theory (Smith, 1976, 1982), the values
and costs used in the experiment (Table 1) constitute individual demand
and supply for each trading period. When summed horizontally (over four
sellers and four buyers) the aggregate supply and demand curves for the
centralized (double auction) market are derived. Competitive price theory
predicts an equilibrium price of 80 tokens and units traded between 20
and 24 units per period. Of course, adding risk of inventory loss in the
spot delivery setting might reduce the number of units traded and in-
crease the price relative to the competitive equilibrium.
Because decentralized markets involve much less formal rules, a great
diversity of designs could be used. We chose a design for our experi-
ments to better serve the purpose of the study. Private negotiation is a
complicated process and usually involves many aspects, such as the
searching and matching problem, reputation, etc. These effects would
necessarily appear if we permitted the subjects to choose a trading part-
ner. We are not interested in investigating these effects in this study, and
our design eliminates them for the purpose of control. Buyers and sellers
were randomly matched in the private negotiation treatments. In these
sessions, matched pairs were given one and one-half minutes to trade
and then another random match was made, for three matches during a
four and one-half-minute trading session. An exception was a treatment
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that was aimed to test if an increase in the number of trading matches
affects market outcomes (the DS5 treatment). In this treatment the
number of matches was increased to five, one minute each. The trading
procedures in the private negotiation sessions followed those of the
double auction except for the number of traders — in private negotiation
only one seller and one buyer pair was involved in the double auction.
Thus, trading in the private negotiation setting in our design is a se-
quence of bilateral monopoly trading. Fig. 2 illustrates the bilateral mo-
nopoly solution for the unit values and unit costs used in our experi-
ments. The predicted quantity traded for the bilateral monopoly case is
four units for both a buyer and a seller, as compared to the competitive
quantity of between five and six units for each participant. Aggregating
units traded for four buyers and four sellers yields a predicted market
quantity of 16 units for the bilateral market setting. Any added risks for
either the buyer or seller might be expected to further reduce units
traded, as compared to the competitive equilibrium. This, for example,
might include the risk of advance production for the seller. The predicted
bilateral monopoly price is in the range of 60 to 100 tokens; the monop-
sony price is 60 tokens. For the spot trading, we are predicting prices
close to this level, rather than the monopoly price of 100 tokens, or even
the competitive auction price of 80 tokens.
Fig. 2. Bilateral Monopoly Model.
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3.4. Market Information
The type of information that is additionally supplied to market partici-
pants raises the issue of market transparency. Bloomfield and O'Hara
(1999) suggest that defining a transparent market is problematic, even
though the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. considers
market transparency as the real time, public dissemination of trade and
quote information. According to Bloomfield and O'Hara, publicly available
trade and quote data are certainly characteristics of transparent markets,
but so too may be data on trade size, trader identity, order type, and the
size and distribution of any limit orders (p. 9).
The above authors investigated transparency effects in financial markets.
These markets are usually more restricted in terms of trade, as com-
pared to agricultural commodity markets. In the real world, however, one
can hardly require traders to necessarily report their quote and price in-
formation for every transaction to increase the degree of transparency in
agricultural markets. A more realistic scenario would be for the govern-
ment or/and private agencies to gather price information for, say, a week
or a month through some survey and to inform the agents about the av-
erage price level in the market. In developed economies, e.g., in the
U.S., information from an existing centralized market is often used by
decentralized traders as the market price level. Often times this informa-
tion serves as a base for a formula pricing in individual negotiations
(Rhodes, 1993, p. 219).
The above issues were primary considerations for the design of the mar-
ket price reports treatments in decentralized spot trading. Four types of
a market price reports were investigated in this study (Phase 5 in Fig. 1):
• Information Treatment 1 — No market information is reported. We
refer to this as the Decentralized Spot treatment (DS);
• Information Treatment 2 — After the trading was completed, we pro-
vided agents with the average price from all trades, which we refer to
as the market price, in the cycle. This is labeled as the Decentralized
Spot/Decentralized Information (DS/DI) treatment;
• Information Treatment 3 — After the trading was completed, we pro-
vided agents with the average price for the three replications from the
trading cycle of the control treatment (spot centralized trading). For
reference the label is the Decentralized Spot/Centralized Information
(DS/CI) treatment;
• Information Treatment 4 — Every trade price was displayed to all par-
ticipants in the session immediately after the trade had been made.
The treatment is labeled the Decentralized Spot/Trade Price (DS/TP).
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In the Information Treatments 2 and 3, the information was announced
aloud, and all participants were required to record it. The participants
could use this information to make production/procurement decisions
and to negotiate price in the next trading cycle. In the Information
Treatment 4, the participants could see every trade price on their com-
puter screens immediately after the trade was made, and the information
was saved and available for the participants during the entire trading
cycle.
3.5. Buyer and Seller Expected Prices
An interesting issue that relates to the effects of information is how mar-
ket news reports influence buyers' and sellers' price expectations. In an
attempt to understand these effects we conducted additional replications
of the decentralized spot trading (Information Treatment 1) and also de-
centralized spot trading with a market price reports (Information Treat-
ment 2). In these replications we required the participants to privately in-
dicate their expected prices for a trading period before trading began,
which they also recorded.
4. EVIDENCE FROM LABORATORY MARKETS
Laboratory markets incorporating alternative trading institutions and
methods of delivery yield data for quantities traded, trade prices, and
earnings for buyers and sellers. The data are initially analyzed graphically
(Appendix A3). Graphical presentations provide general impressions of
the behavior of experimental data and are a useful first step in the analy-
sis (Davis and Holt, 1993). A more complete description of the charac-
teristics of the data generated in the experiments conducted in this study
is provided by means of a convergence model (Ashenfelter et al., 1992;
Noussair, Plott, and Reizman, 1995).
The experimental data generated over several time periods, pooled with
cross section data (for example across the treatments described in the
presentation of the experimental design) may be serially correlated and
heteroscedastic. Data also may be contemporaneously correlated be-
tween cross sections due to the same unit values/costs being used, as
an example, between and among alternative treatments. We estimate
variations of the following general convergence model.
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where
Pit — average sale price (or units traded or earnings) across all replica-
tions and all trades for each of t cycles in cross section (treatment) i;
B0 — the predicted asymptote of the dependent variable for the base
category (Dj);
B1 — predicted starting level of the data;
t — trading cycles — 1, ..., 15;
i — treatment (1, ..., 9) competitive norm (base), centralized forward,
decentralized forward, centralized spot, decentralized spot, decentralized
spot /decentralized information, and decentralized spot / centralized in-
formation, decentralized spot / trade prices, and decentralized spot with
5 matches;
Dj — dummy variable representing treatment; the competitive norm is the
base; and
uit — error term.
The asymptote values are of primary interest in this study, particularly
how they differ across treatments. Sale prices (and units traded and
earnings) for a treatment are averaged across the replications to reduce
the influence of individual agents.
The Parks (1967) method is used to estimate the model. This is
an autoregressive model in which the random errors uit, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
t = 1, 2, ..., T, have the structures (SAS, 1993).
E ( 2itu ) = σii (heteroscedasticity).
E (uit) = σji (contemporaneously correlated).
uit = ρi ui, t–1 + εit (autoregression).
The Parks method assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure
with contemporaneous correlation between cross sections. The covari-
ance matrix is obtained by a two-stage procedure leading to the estima-
tion of model regression parameters by generalized least squares. (See
SAS, pp. 882 – 884, for details of this estimation method.) The use of
the Parks method allows us to take account of the unique statistical
problems resulting from the panel data sets that consist of time series
observations on each of the several cross-sectional units generated in
our experiments. The method requires the number of observations per
cross section to be balanced and the number of time series observations
to be greater than the number of cross-sections. The latter constraint
precluded pooling, e.g., buyer and seller earnings for analysis in one
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equation. Differences were used as the dependent variable in the con-
vergence model in this case. The estimated convergence model and re-
lated statistical tests are reported in Appendix A4.
In the following, the results of the twenty-nine experimental sessions are
summarized and analyzed:7
• centralized forward market (CF) — 3 replications;
• decentralized forward market (DF) — 3 replications;
• centralized spot market (CS) — 3 replications;
• decentralized spot market (DS) — 3 replications + 3 replications with
participants privately indicating their expected prices;
• decentralized spot market with additionally provided information about
previous period average price in the same replication of the decen-
tralized market (DS/DI) — 3 replications + 3 replications with partici-
pants privately indicating their expected prices;
• decentralized spot market with additionally provided information about
previous period average price in the three replications of the central-
ized spot market (DS/CI) — 2 replications;
• decentralized spot market with additionally provided immediate infor-
mation about every trade price in the same replication of the decen-
tralized spot market (DS/TP) — 3 replications;
• decentralized spot market with five available trading matches in a
trading cycle (DS5) — 3 replications.
The experiments generated data for several market outcomes — prices,
quantities produced and traded, total earnings, and seller and buyer
earnings. The results are reported focusing on three major issues — De-
centralized and Centralized Trading with Forward and Spot Deliveries,
Decentralized Spot Trading with Market Price Reports, and Decentralized
Spot Trading with five, as opposed to three, available trading matches in
a trading cycle.
4.1. Decentralized and Centralized Trading
with Forward and Spot Deliveries
Average trade prices in centralized and decentralized trading with both
forward and spot deliveries are presented in Fig. 4 in Appendix A3.
                                               
7 The data from the additional replications in which expected prices were re-
quested from agents in the DS and DS/DI treatments were pooled with data from
the initial replications in these respective treatments. A test of mean prices and
quantities traded (Wilcoxon non-parametric test) from the last five periods across
replications for each respective treatment showed no statistical differences.
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Prices in centralized trading, whether forward or spot delivery (CF and
CS), and also prices in decentralized forward trading (DF) tend toward
the predicted competitive equilibrium of 80 tokens. The average prices
for the latter periods are 77.70, 82.28, and 80.39 tokens for CF, CS, and
DF, respectively (Table 2). Prices in the decentralized spot market (DS)
are noticeably lower (74.33 tokens), as compared with prices in central-
ized trading (Fig. 4 and Table 2). Prices in decentralized forward and
spot trading exhibit relatively more variability than in centralized trading.
The most variable prices are in the decentralized spot trading.8
Table 2. Averages and Variances for Selected Treatments and Market Outcomes
(Periods 11 – 15).
Price Quantity Total Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var. Av. Var.
CF* 77.70 9.09 21.73 0.78 1189.00 220.95
DF 80.39 43.34 16.27 1.07 1050.67 1920.95
CS 82.28 6.16 21.33 0.67 1186.67 409.52
DS 74.33 46.94 16.67 6.23 1061.00 5898.97
Seller Earnings Buyer Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var.
CF* 137.42 259.47 159.92 176.08
DF 132.88 802.16 129.75 902.61
CS 158.73 235.66 137.93 179.06
DS 107.37 1327.19 157.88 913.39
* CF and CS — centralized forward and spot markets, respectively;
DF and DS — decentralized forward and spot market, respectively.
There are considerable differences in quantities traded between central-
ized and decentralized trading (Fig. 5). Quantities sold/purchased in
centralized forward and spot trading average 21.73 and 21.33, respec-
tively, for the last five periods (Table 2). These levels are in the predicted
competitive equilibrium range (20 to 24 units). Quantities traded in the
                                               
8 We ran six replications of this treatment as compared to three replications of
any other treatment in the Table 2, but the price variance in the DS treatment is
still the highest, although it approached the price variance in the DF treatment
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decentralized markets are lower than those in the centralized market and
average about 16 units for both forward and spot deliveries. Thus, in
latter periods, agents each traded about four units, which is consistent
with the prediction from the bilateral monopoly model (Fig. 2). Quantity
traded in decentralized spot trading is much more variable than in any
other trading considered.
Lower quantities traded in the decentralized markets reduces total earn-
ings, as compared to the total earnings in centralized trading (Fig. 6).
Earnings in the centralized forward and spot markets are about 99 per-
cent of the total possible earnings in the competitive model (1200 to-
kens), as compared to about 88 percent in the DF and DS markets. Vari-
ability in total earnings is greater in decentralized trading than in
centralized trading, and total earnings in decentralized spot trading is
three times more variable than in decentralized forward trading (Table 2).
The difference in the distribution of earnings between sellers and buyers
is greatest in the case of the decentralized spot market (Figs 7 and 8
and Table 2). The variability in earnings for both sellers and buyers also
is greatest in this treatment, as compared with the CF, CS and DF mar-
kets. Clearly, there is a significant impact on the distribution of earnings
associated with decentralized trading and spot delivery.
The impacts of alternative trading and delivery mechanisms can be as-
sessed more definitively through the use of results from the convergence
model described earlier (Table A4.1 in Appendix A4). Estimated price as-
ymptotes for the CF, DF, CS, and DS markets are 76.668, 80.920,
81.399, and 74.459, respectively (Table 3). The price asymptotes in each
of the CF, DF, and DS treatment are significantly different (α = 0.05) from
the base competitive model price of 80 tokens, and the estimated
asymptote for DS exhibits the greatest divergence (Table A4.1 in Appen-
dix A4). Paired differences in convergence price levels in each case are
significantly different, except estimated asymptotes in DF and CS mar-
kets (Table 3). Comparing the predicted starting values with the pre-
dicted asymptotes, we see that prices in these treatments do not exhibit
an obvious trend, either upward or downward.
Estimated asymptotes for quantity traded in the markets under consid-
eration are 22.605 for CF, 21.316 for CS, 16.330 for DF, and 16.416 for
DS. The quantity asymptotes in the DF and DS markets are significantly
(α=0.05) lower than the base competitive norm of 20 units (Table A4.1).
The difference in estimated asymptotes for quantity traded in the CF and
CS markets is significant (α = 0.05). Also significant are the differences
in asymptotes for CF and DF and for the CS and DS markets (Table 3).
The difference in the estimated asymptotes for the DF and DS markets is
not statistically significant. The estimated asymptote (22.605) was con-
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siderably higher than the estimated starting value (14.824) for the cen-
tralized forward market, i.e., the CF quantity traded demonstrated an
upward trend. There were no obvious upward or downward trends in
quantity over periods in other treatments.
Table 3. Estimated Asymptotes and Starting Values for Selected Treatments.
Centralized Forward (CF) Decentralized Forward (DF)
Variable
Asymptote Starting value Asymptote Starting value
Price 76.668 a* 81.218 80.920 b 82.833
Quantity Traded 22.605 a 14.824 16.330 b 15.842
Total Earning 1207.265 a 1008.791 1055.257 b 1061.230
Buyer Earnings 166.320 a 118.593 128.878 b 121.610
Seller Earnings 136.002 a 131.553 135.045 a 143.084
Buyer/Seller Earnings
Difference 31.533 a –18.625 –6.137 b –21.894
Centralized Spot (CS) Decentralized Spot (DS)
Variable
Asymptote Starting value Asymptote Starting value
Price 81.399 b 78.708 74.459 d 73.835
Quantity Traded 21.316 c 21.922 16.416 b 16.801
Total Earning 1183.159 c 1171.344 1050.440 b 968.600
Buyer Earnings 141.609 c 159.302 153.653 d 152.578
Seller Earnings 155.282 132.584 108.918 88.352
Buyer/Seller Earnings
Difference –12.128 b 18.700 43.393 a 69.429
* a,b,c,d — same letter indicates no significant difference between estimated asymptotes in
the respective equations. A different letter indicates a significant difference between esti-
mated asymptotes, α = 0.05.
The asymptotes for total earnings are estimated as 1207.265, 1055.257,
1183.159 and 1050.440 for the CF, in DF, CS, and DS markets are sig-
nificantly different from the DF, CS, and DS markets, respectively. The
estimated total earnings asymptotes base competitive norm of 1200 to-
kens (α = 0.05, Table A4.1). Paired differences in convergence total
earnings levels are significantly different (α = 0.05, Table 3) for each of
the considered treatments except for the difference between the DS and
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DF treatments. The starting value estimates are considerably lower than
the estimated asymptotes in the CF and DS markets, suggesting upward
trends in the convergence process for total earnings in these treatments.
Thus, learning from one trading period to another obviously helped the
market participants to increase their total earnings.
Buyer earnings in the CF, DF, CS, and DS converged to levels of
166.320, 128.878, 141.609, and 153.653, respectively. According to sta-
tistical tests presented in Table A4.1, the estimated asymptotes are sig-
nificantly lower than the base competitive norm of 150 tokens in the DF
and CS markets (α = 0.05). The buyer earnings asymptotes in the other
two treatments are not significantly different from the competitive norm.
Differences in estimated asymptotes between all pairs of the selected
treatments are significant (α = 0.05, Table 3). The differences between
the estimated asymptotes and starting values suggest an upward trend
in the CF buyer earnings convergence level.
The estimated asymptotes for the seller earnings in the CF, DF, CS, and
DS are 136.002, 135.045, 155.282, and 108.918, respectively. The as-
ymptotes are significantly lower than the competitive norm of 150 tokens
for all of the treatments but the CS treatment (α = 0.05, Table A4.1). The
DS seller earnings asymptote is associated with the lowest value, which
is more than 41 tokens lower than the competitive equilibrium result.
Differences in seller earnings asymptotes for any two of the selected
treatments are significant, except for the CF and DF treatments
(Table 3). In the centralized and decentralized spot markets (CS and DS)
there are obvious upward trends in the seller earnings convergence pro-
cesses.
The last set of estimated coefficients describes differences in buyer and
seller earnings, i.e., the distribution of earnings between buyers and
sellers in the selected treatments. According to the estimated asymp-
totes, buyer earnings exceed seller earnings by 31.533 in the CF market,
and by 43.393 in the DS market. In the DF and CS markets seller earn-
ings exceed buyer earnings by 6.137 and 12.128, respectively. The dif-
ferences in the estimated asymptotes from the competitive norm of zero
tokens are significant for all but the CS treatments. Differences in as-
ymptotes are significant for any two of the treatments, except the differ-
ences in the DF and CS asymptotes and also in the DS and CF asymp-
totes (Table A4.1 and Table 3). A comparison of the asymptotes and the
starting values suggests that in the early periods of the CF market seller
earnings exceeded buyer earnings, but this reverses in the latter periods.
In contrast, in the early periods of the CS market seller earnings were
lower than the buyer earnings, but in the latter periods seller earnings
exceeded buyer earnings. In the decentralized forward market the seller
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earnings were higher than the buyer earnings, but the difference in seller
and buyer earnings tends to decrease in the latter periods. Buyer earn-
ings in the DS market were considerably higher than seller earnings, but
the difference decreased in the latter periods as compared to the early
periods.
The above results suggest that the competitive model is appropriate for
predicting behavior in centralized trading for both forward and spot de-
liveries. This model accurately predicts tendencies in both price and
quantity outcomes. In the centralized spot market, price converged to a
higher level and quantity converged to a lower level than in the central-
ized forward market. The latter is consistent with the theory presented in
the Appendix A1 of this paper. Market efficiencies in centralized forward
and spot trading are near the optimum.
The bilateral monopoly model accurately predicts the quantities traded in
decentralized forward and spot institutions. Quantity is reduced as com-
pared to the competitive optimum (supporting Proposition 1) and this re-
sults in reduced market efficiency. In the theory section, we proposed
that decentralized market price would range between the pure monopoly
and pure monopsony level but would be affected by the delivery method.
For the forward delivery, price would be close to the competitively de-
termined equilibrium, while for the spot delivery, price would be lower
than the forward price and tend to the monospony level. This is the re-
sult we observe from our experiments, adding evidence to support
Proposition 2. There is no obvious bargaining advantage to buyers or
sellers in forward delivery and price in the decentralized forward market
converged to a level close to the competitive equilibrium outcome. The
difference in buyer and seller earnings is rather small. But, when the
seller is faced with decentralized trading in spot delivery, he/she is
clearly at a disadvantage to the buyer. This is due to the risk of inventory
loss associated with advance production. Evidently, the more competitive
nature of bidding in the centralized spot market, combined with the abil-
ity of sellers to adjust production, allows sellers to compensate the ad-
vance production risk through a higher market price.
4.2. Pattern of Trades
Quantities and prices for bargaining sessions 1 – 3 across all replications
and for cycles 11 – 15 of decentralized markets are reported in Ta-
ble A5.1 in Appendix A5. The data show the distribution of trades and
prices across bargaining sessions. Trade data reported in Table A5.1
suggest that subjects have a desire to complete trades in the initial bar-
gaining sessions. Most (40 – 50%) of trades are made in bargaining
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session 1 and 70 – 75% of the trades occur in sessions 1 and 2. We use
these data as evidence of a "matching risk" for buyers and sellers in
latter trading sessions.
There are two sources of matching risk in private negotiation trading,
and they vary depending on the method of delivery. One is the risk asso-
ciated with a match in latter trading sessions that pairs a buyer and a
seller in which one or the other may not gain from the trade. This risk is
present in both forward and spot deliveries. The other matching risk oc-
curs only in spot delivery and is associated with a match that pairs a
buyer with a seller who has sold all units in previous sessions; the seller
has no more inventory. The former risk potentially reduces the range of
prices over which negotiation can occur during trading sessions 2 and 3
in our experiment. It depends on the number of units traded by the
paired buyer and seller in previous sessions and as such may not exist in
all buyer and seller pairings. It likely contributes to early trading, as is
evident in the DF market (Table A5.1). However, average prices in each
of the trading sessions in the DF market tend to be near the competitive
equilibrium level and decline only about three tokens by session three,
suggesting that neither buyer nor seller has a bargaining advantage over
a trading cycle.
The matching risk has a stronger impact in the DS market because of
advance production. We argued that price in the decentralized spot mar-
ket should tend to 60 tokens, but because of matching risk could be
higher. Data presented in Table A5.1 generally support these predic-
tions. The seller, based on the price recorded for session 1, as com-
pared to that in the DF market, seems to be more anxious to trade than
the buyer. The seller is influenced by the potential loss of inventory. By
bargaining session 3 there is a clear advantage to buyers in decentral-
ized spot treatments, as reflected by the low price. However, even in
session 3 the average price is 70.42 tokens instead of the monopsony
level of 60 tokens. As we argued earlier, the matching risk buyers face
may dilute some of their bargaining power and makes the market more
competitive.
4.3. Decentralized Spot Trading with Market Information
We now will discuss the results of experiments with additionally supplied
market information in decentralized spot markets. The results of these
experiments are compared with those generated from the decentralized
spot trading without additional market information. We have hypothesized
that the additional price information will not result in a higher efficiency in
the private negotiation spot market.
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Fig. 9 in Appendix A3 displays average trade prices by period in the de-
centralized spot market institutions with market information of different
types. Prices in the decentralized spot market with decentralized market
price reports (DS/DI) are very close to those in the decentralized spot
market without additional market information (DS). On the other hand,
prices in both the decentralized market with centralized price reports
(DS/CI) and decentralized spot market with all trade prices reported
were consistently lower than prices in the DS treatment. Averaged over
the latter five periods, prices in the DS/DI, DS/CI, and DS/TP treatments
are 74.81, 63.93, and 66.92 tokens, respectively (Table 4). Thus, the av-
erage price reports from the same decentralized market did not bring
the prices closer to the competitive equilibrium norm of 80 tokens. At the
same time, the DS/CI and DS/TP average prices were even more biased
from the competitive equilibrium than the DS prices. Price variances in
the DS/DI and the DS/TP treatments are higher, and price variance in
the DS/CI is lower than in the DS market.
Table 4. Averages and Variances for Selected Treatments and Market Outcomes
(Periods 11 – 15).
Price Quantity Total Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var. Av. Var.
DS 74.33 46.94 16.67 6.23 1061.00 5898.97
DS/DI* 74.81 76.85 14.37 2.79 968.67 5701.61
DS/CI 63.93 7.64 16.40 1.16 1031.00 6276.67
DS/TP 66.92 302.3 13.47 16.98 940.667 24535.24
Seller Earnings Buyer Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var.
DS 107.37 1327.19 157.88 913.39
DS/DI* 104.20 1443.43 137.97 938.74
DS/CI 59.83 403.08 197.93 196.39
DS/TP 89.47 4496.18 145.70 1287.83
* DS/DI — decentralized spot market with average decentralized price reports (information);
DS/CI — decentralized spot market with average centralized price reports (information);
DS/TP — decentralized spot market with every trade price immediately reported.
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As is the case in the decentralized spot market, quantity traded in the
market with centralized price reports is very close to the bilateral mo-
nopoly prediction (Fig. 10). Average quantity traded in the latter periods
of the DS/CI market is 16.40. Quantities traded in the both DS/DI and
DS/TP markets were consistently lower and for the latter periods aver-
aged 14.37 and 13.47 units, respectively. Quantity traded exhibits rela-
tively high variability in the DS/TP market.
Similar levels of quantities traded in the DS and DS/CI markets, as ex-
pected, resulted in similar levels of total earnings (Fig. 11). Market effi-
ciency in the latter periods of DS/CI market is 1031.00 tokens or about
86% of available surplus of 1200 tokens (Table 4). Market efficiency in
the DS/DI market is lower (968.67 tokens) and is 81% of available sur-
plus. Market efficiency in the DS/TP treatment is even lower — 940.67
tokens or 78% of available surplus. These reductions in market efficiency
in the DS/DI and DS/TP markets are a result of lower quantities traded.
Total earnings are characterized by high variability in each of the decen-
tralized spot markets, with the highest variability in the DS/TP total earn-
ings.
Average seller and buyer earnings also exhibit high variability (Figs 12
and 13). Seller earnings for the latter periods averaged 104.20, 59.83,
and 89.47 tokens in the DS/DI, DS/CI, and DS/TP markets, respectively
(Table 4). Thus, in both the DS/CI and DS/TP markets seller earnings
are considerably lower than in DS market, while in the DS/DI market
seller earnings are only slightly lower than in the DS market. Buyer
earnings are considerably higher than seller earnings in each of the de-
centralized spot markets. In the latter periods of the DS/DI, DS/CI, and
DS/TP markets buyer earnings are 137.97, 197.93, and 145.70 tokens,
respectively. Note that in competitive equilibrium sellers and buyers earn
150 tokens each. Obviously, price reports affected the distribution of
earnings between sellers and buyers and lowered earnings to sellers
compared with the no additional information treatment.
Further, the convergence model estimations are used to better assess
the impacts of market price reports and test statistical inferences. Esti-
mated asymptotes for price in the DS/DI, DS/CI, and DS/TP markets are
73.415, 64.280, and 67.730, respectively (Table 5). These asymptotes
are significantly different from the base competitive norm of 80 tokens
(α = 0.05; Table A4.1 in Appendix A4). The DS/CI and DS/TP price as-
ymptotes are also significantly lower than the DS price asymptote
(α = 0.05), while there is no statistically significant difference in DS and
DS/DI price asymptotes (Table 5). Paired differences in convergence
price levels in the DS/DI, DS/CI, and DS/TP treatments are statistically
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significant. We do not observe obvious upward or downward trends in
the price convergence in any of the DS/DI, DS/CI, or DS/TP markets.
The estimated asymptotes for the quantities traded are 14.222 for the
DS/DI market, 16.121 for the DS/CI market, and 13.183 for the DS/TP
market (Table 5). These three asymptotes are significantly different from
the competitive norm and from each other (α = 0.05, Tables A4.1 and 5).
The asymptotes for the quantity traded in the DS/DI and DS/TP markets
are also significantly different from the DS quantity traded asymptote of
16.416. The latter is not significantly different from DS/CI asymptote. A
comparison of the estimated asymptotes with the estimated starting val-
ues indicates downward trends in the convergence of the DS/CI average
quantity traded (from 18.823 to 16.121) and the DS/TP quantity traded
(from 17.361 to 13.183).
Table 5. Estimated Asymptotes and Starting Values for Selected Treatments.
Decentralized Spot (DS) DS/DI
Variable
Asymptote Starting value Asymptote Starting value
Price 74.459 a* 73.835 73.415 a 72.267
Quantity Traded 16.416 a 16.801 14.222 b 14.971
Total Earning 1050.440 a 968.600 967.489 b 946.215
Buyer Earnings 153.653 a 152.578 140.106 b 155.408
Seller Earnings 108.918 a 88.352 100.270 b 87.358
Buyer/Seller
Earnings
Difference 43.393 a 69.429 41.927 a 57.930
DS/CI DS/TP
Variable
Asymptote Starting value Asymptote Starting value
Price 64.280 c 69.064 67.730 d 70.372
Quantity Traded 16.121 a 18.823 13.183 d 17.361
Total Earning 1024.819 a 932.266 931.047 d 1114.043
Buyer Earnings 192.593 c 191.441 142.84 b 167.513
Seller Earnings 63.213 c 45.861 89.832 d 110.294
Buyer/Seller
Earnings
Difference 131.520 c 138.019 52.210 a 59.097
*a, b, c, d — same letter indicates no significant difference between estimated asymptotes in
the respective equations. A different letter indicates a significant difference between esti-
mated asymptotes, α = 0.05;
DS/DI — Decentralized Spot / Decentralized Price Reports;
DS/CI — Decentralized Spot / Centralized Price Reports;
DS/TP — Decentralized Spot / All Trade Prices Reported.
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Total earnings converged to 967.489 in the DS/DI market, to 1024.819 in
the DS/CI market, and to 931.047 in the DS/TP market, according to
the estimated asymptotes (Table 5). Each of the three asymptotes
are significantly different from the base competitive norm (α = 0.05; Ta-
ble A4.1). The differences in these three asymptotes and also in the
DS/DI and DS asymptotes and in the DS/TP and DS asymptotes are sig-
nificant (Table 5). There is no significant difference in estimated asymp-
totes for the total earnings in the DS and DS/CI markets. Total earnings
convergence in the DS/CI market occurred from below (from 932.266 to
1024.819), similar to that in the DS market. There is a downward trend in
the total earnings convergence in the DS/TP market (from 1114.043 to
931.047).
Estimated asymptotes for buyer earnings are 140.106, 192.593, and
142.84 in the DS/DI, DS/CI, and DS/TP markets, respectively (Table 5).
The difference in any of the asymptotes and both the competitive norm
and the DS asymptote is significant (α = 0.05; Table A4.1 and Table 5).
Also the DS/CI buyer earnings asymptote is significantly different from
both the DS/DI and the DS/TP buyer earnings. The latter two are not
significantly different from each other. There is no significant difference
in the DS/DI and DS/TP buyer earnings estimated asymptotes. Buyer
earnings in the DS/DI and DS/TP markets demonstrate a downward
trend (from 155.408 to 140.408, and from 167.513 to 142.84, respec-
tively).
The estimated asymptote for seller earnings in the DS/DI treatment is
100.270, in DS/CI is 63.213, in DS/TP is 89.832 (Table 5). The paired
differences in these asymptotes is significant (α = 0.05). Also each of
these asymptotes is significantly different from the competitive norm
and from the DS asymptote (α = 0.05, Table 5 and Table A4.1). Accord-
ing to results presented in Table 5, seller earnings in the DS/DI and
DS/CI treatments converged from below, and in the DS/TP treatment
seller earnings converged from above. But the graphical presentation in
Fig. 12 does not demonstrate an obvious trend in any of these treat-
ments.
According to the estimated asymptotes, buyer earnings exceed seller
earnings by 41.927 in the DS/DI market, by 131.520 in the DS/CI mar-
ket, and by 52.210 in the DS/TP market (Table 5). These asymptotes are
significantly different from the competitive norm (α = 0.05; Table A4.1).
The DS/CI asymptote is also significantly different from the DS and
DS/DI asymptotes. The DS/DI and DS/TP asymptotes are not signifi-
cantly different from each other and the DS asymptote (Table 5). Com-
parisons with the starting values suggest that the difference in the
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buyer/seller earnings decreased in the DS/DI market from 57.930 to
41.927, but this difference was relatively stable in the DS/CI and DS/TP
markets.
The above analyses suggest that additionally provided price information
(DS/DI — average market price from the previous trading period of the
same replication; DS/CI — average market price from the previous pe-
riod of the three replications of the centralized trading; DS/TP — all trade
price reported from the same period of the same replication) can im-
pede market efficiency or at best, does not improve market efficiency in
decentralized spot markets. Market efficiency, in fact, decreased in the
DS/DI and DS/TP markets, as compared to decentralized trading with
spot delivery without price reports. Thus, the results of our experiments
support our Proposition 3. Moreover, in the DS/CI and DS/TP treatments
the price decreased and moved further away from the competitive equi-
librium, and the distribution of earnings between buyers and sellers
moved more in favor of the buyers, at the expense of the sellers. Quanti-
ties traded in the DS and DS/CI markets follow those predicted by the
bilateral monopoly model, but are lower than the predicted 16 units in
the DS/DI and DS/TP markets.
4.4. How Do Agents Use Market Information?
An important aspect of laboratory markets is learning. The information
gathered by agents in early periods contribute to the observed levels of
convergence in, e.g., price in latter periods. The information flow that
contributes to learning is attributable to the bid and ask values, which
are made during the bidding processes in alternative trading institutions,
and the resulting earnings of participants in the experiment. Successful
behavior becomes more prevalent not only because market forces select
against unsuccessful behavior in our experiments, but also because
agents imitate successful behavior. Learning, in fact, may be the best
available justification for the Nash equilibrium (Mailath, 1998). The nature
of the trading institution itself provides information that is available to
agents. Bids and offers are common knowledge to all traders in the
centralized trading institution, but are private to the individual buyer and
seller in bilateral trading. Another source of information flow is the addi-
tionally provided market information in the respective treatments in our
experiments.
Information about average price could be used by both sellers and buy-
ers to decide what price level would be sufficient to make a trade. It
could be supposed that agents would consider the average reported
price as some kind of "a fair price level", and they would then be willing
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to make trades at that price. In this case, price variance within a replica-
tion would be lower in the information treatments than in the treatment
with no price reports. However, the data generated in the experiments
can hardly support this supposition (Table 6.1 in Appendix A6). Decen-
tralized trading results in prices that are highly variable and additional
information of any type considered in our experiments does not seem to
reduce this variability. However, each agent could use the additionally
provided information to follow his/her strategy based on his/her risk
preferences, bargaining abilities, and the like. This strategy could incor-
porate some formula pricing with the reported average price being the
base. High price variances then could be explained by differences in in-
dividual agents.
In replications 4 to 6 of the DS and DS/DI treatments we asked the par-
ticipants to privately indicate their expected prices in the beginning of a
trading cycle to better understand how price reports influenced an
agent's behavior. Expected buyer and seller prices per period averaged
for the three replications of the DS and DS/DI markets are displayed in
the Figs 14 and 15 in Appendix A3. The expected price information was
analyzed to assess the impacts of average decentralized price
reports on average trade prices and expected buyer/seller prices.
The Parks method was used to estimate the models (Appendix A4,
Table A4.2). The estimated coefficients suggest that trade price as well
as both expected seller and buyer prices tend to be lower when average
market price is reported to the participants. The estimated coefficient for
the DS/DI treatment dummy variable is –40.101 in the trade price model,
–26.227 in the seller expected price model, and –40.874 in the buyer
expected price model (statistically significant, α = 0.05). Another result
suggesting that average price reports were used by the participants to
form their expectations and to negotiate a price is that the effects of the
previous period price on trade prices, as well as on both seller and buyer
expected prices, are higher in the decentralized spot market when mar-
ket price is reported to the participants. The estimated coefficient for the
previous period price times the DS/DI treatment dummy variable is 1.058
in the trade price model, 0.307 in the seller expected price model, and
0.426 in the buyer expected price model (statistically significant,
α = 0.05).
Also, information about average price was used by a seller to decide on
how many units to produce. The upward individual cost step function
(Table 1) suggests that it could be risky to produce those units for which
production costs are higher than the reported average price. Fig. 16 in
Appendix A3 displays the average quantity produced by a seller in each
trading cycle of the decentralized spot market treatments. Average
4. EVIDENCE FROM LABORATORY MARKETS 35
quantity produced by a seller in the latter periods of the decentralized
spot market with no information (DS) was 4.34, i.e., 4 to 5 units for a
seller. In the market with decentralized average price reports (DS/DI),
average quantity produced by a seller was consistently lower. In the lat-
ter periods of this market, a seller produced 3 to 4 units (average was
3.79). Average price in the latter periods of this market was 74.81 tokens
(Table 4). This price was sufficiently high to sell at a positive profit up to
5 units (Table 1). But the 5th unit would likely bring only a little marginal
profit, and a seller may not wish to take the risk of possible losses given
the little possible profit from the marginal unit.
In the market with centralized average price reports (DS/CI), a seller
produced on average 4.30 units, i.e., 4 or 5 units in this market setting.
Average price in the latter periods was 63.93 tokens, i.e., sufficiently
high to produce and sell at a positive profit only four units. To produce
the 5th unit was quite risky. At the same time, average price in the latter
periods of the centralized spot market (price reported in the DS/CI mar-
ket) was 82.28 tokens (Table 2). This price would be sufficiently high to
produce up to 6 units. It seems that the sellers were using the reported
price to make their production decisions, although they faced difficulties
selling the last unit at a profit. The higher reported market price ap-
peared to prompt slightly higher production.
In the latter periods of the DS/TP market a seller produced on average
3.47 units, i.e., 3 or 4 units for a seller. The average price for the latter
periods in this treatment was 66.92 (Table 4), therefore, it was just suffi-
cient to produce and sell at a profit up to 4 units (Table 1).
Thus, we argue that the price reports were used by sellers to adjust
their production decisions. But, the lower quantities produced and
traded in both the DS/DI and DS/TP treatments, as compared to the
DS treatment, did not result in higher prices. In fact, price went down
in the DS/TP markets as compared with the DS price. The DS/CI
price also was lower than the DS price. This supports the argument
made earlier that in the case of private negotiation any additional in-
formation that induces a seller to produce less or more only de-
creases the seller's earnings or, at least, does not increase it. Buyers
do not have any incentive to buy more units for a higher price than
the DS price. When additional information induces less production, a
buyer may go down the cost schedule and pay even less than when
more units are supplied. Note that the lowest quantity traded in the
DS/TP market was accompanied by a relatively low price (Table 5).
When additionally provided information induces more production than
a reasonable level for a risk averse producer given the average de-
centralized price (as in the DS/CI treatment), a buyer agrees to buy
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the additional units only for a lower price and, as a result, average
price decreases.
Moreover, because of the relatively weak bargaining position of the sell-
ers in the spot decentralized market, the reported price level is more
likely considered as the upper boundary of the price interval. Therefore,
when a reported price is relatively low the sellers seem to be more will-
ing to accept low bids from the buyers, while the buyers seem to be-
come even more difficult bargainers.
Besides, additionally supplied information seems to provide yet another
increased negotiation advantage to buyers. Recall that in the DS/TP
treatment quantity traded was one unit less and price was almost six to-
kens less than in the DS/DI treatment. In both treatments the agents re-
ceived price information from the replication they participated in; average
price from trades in the previous production cycle was additionally pro-
vided in the DS/DI treatment and, in the DS/TP treatment price was re-
ported for all trades as they occur during a production cycle. Therefore,
in the DS/TP treatment the agents implicitly received information about
quantity traded in addition to the price information. Information about
quantity traded allows buyers to be more patient and mitigate the
"matching risk" that they face.
Thus, public information additionally provided to the experimental market
participants resulted in reduced quantity traded or/and reduced price.
The public information, therefore, seems to be detrimental to improving
efficiency of decentralized spot market. We consider this as an evidence
of a "curse of knowledge". In the decentralized market with no price re-
ports, the agents do not know the average price and must trust only their
own experience. This is Smith's private information. The agents' profit
seeking behavior may then result in a higher production and total earn-
ings in the DS market.
4.5. Decentralized Trading
with Five versus Three Matched Pairs
In all of the decentralized trading experiments discussed above there
were three available bargaining matches during a trading cycle. We now
consider the results of the decentralized spot market experiments when
a trading cycle consists of five trading matches.
Average trade prices by period in the decentralized spot markets with
three (DS) and five (DS5) available matches are displayed in Fig. 17 in
Appendix A3. Prices in the DS5 treatment are consistently higher than in
the DS treatment. Prices averaged over the latter five periods in the DS5
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market are 78.14 tokens while in the DS market prices are 74.33 tokens
(Table 6). Price variance is lower in the DS5 market despite the fewer
replications in this treatment as compare to DS (three versus six replica-
tions, respectively). Nevertheless, average price in the DS5 treatment is
still lower, and the variance is higher, than in the CS treatment.
Quantity traded in the DS5 market is also higher than in the DS (Fig. 18).
For the latter periods, average quantity traded in the DS5 market is
17.20 as compared with 16.67 in the DS market (Table 6). The quantity
variance is lower in the DS5 market. The quantity variance in this market
is close that in the CS market, although the average quantity is still con-
siderably higher in the latter.
Table 6. Averages and Variances for Selected Treatments and Market Outcomes
(Periods 11 – 15).
Price Quantity Total Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var. Av. Var.
CS 82.28 6.16 21.33 0.67 1186.67 409.52
DS 74.33 46.94 16.67 6.23 1061.00 5898.97
DS5* 78.14 14.88 17.20 0.60 1098.67 1598.10
Seller Earnings Buyer Earnings
Av. Var. Av. Var.
CS 158.73 235.66 137.93 179.06
DS 107.37 1327.19 157.88 913.39
DS5* 131.25 189.46 143.42 231.22
* DS5 — decentralized spot market with five matched pairs.
Higher average price and average quantity resulted in increased total
earnings in the DS5 treatment as compared with the DS treatment —
1198.67 and 1061.00, respectively (Table 6 and Fig. 19). Total earnings
variance is reduced in the DS5 market. But the total earnings in the DS5
market is still lower, and earnings variance is higher, in the DS5 market
as compared with CS.
Seller earnings are higher in the DS5 market and for the latter periods
averaged 131.25 tokens as compared with 107.37 tokens in the DS mar-
ket (Table 6 and Fig. 20). Again, seller earnings variance decreased in
the DS5 market. But seller earnings are still higher (158.73 tokens) and
its variance is still lower in the CS market as compared with DS5 market.
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Buyer earnings are reduced in the DS5 market as compared with DS
market — 143.42 and 157.88 tokens, respectively (Table 6 and Fig. 21).
Buyer earnings variance also is reduced. The variance is even lower in
the CS market, and the average buyer earnings are also lower in this
market (137.93 tokens).
We again used the convergence model estimation to better assess the
impacts of the increased number of available bargaining matches in the
decentralized trading and spot delivery. The estimated asymptote for
price in the DS5 treatment is 77.607 (Table 7). This is significantly differ-
ent from the competitive norm of 80 tokens, and also is significantly dif-
ferent from estimated asymptotes for both DS and CS markets — 74.459
and 81.399, respectively (α = 0.05, Table A4.1 and Table 7). Comparison
with the estimated starting value suggests a slight upward trend in the
DS5 price convergence process (from 72.528 to 77.609). This trend is
also noticeable in the Fig. 17.
The quantity traded estimated asymptote for the DS5 treatment is
17.111, and this is significantly lower than the competitive norm of 20
(α = 0.05, Tables 7 and 4.1). The estimated asymptote in the DS5 mar-
ket is also significantly different from the asymptotes in both the DS
(16.416) and CS (21.316) treatments (α = 0.05). There is no obvious
upward or downward trend in the convergence of the quantity traded in
the DS5 market.
The estimated asymptote for total earnings in the DS5 market is
1095.381, and this is significantly lower than the competitive norm
(α = 0.05, Tables 7 and 4.1). The DS5 estimated asymptote is also sig-
nificantly different from the total earnings estimated asymptotes in both
the DS (1050.440) and CS (1183.159) treatments (α = 0.05). The esti-
mated asymptote for the DS5 total earnings is very close to the esti-
mated starting value suggesting no upward or downward trends in the
convergence process.
The buyer earnings estimated asymptote in the DS5 market is 145.272.
The asymptote is not significantly different from the competitive norm of
150 and from the estimated asymptote of the CS market (α = 0.05, Ta-
bles 7 and 4.1). But the DS5 asymptote is significantly lower from the
estimated asymptote in the DS market (153.653). A comparison of the
asymptote with the estimated starting value suggests a downward trend
in the DS5 buyer earnings convergence level.
For seller earnings the estimated asymptote in the DS5 treatment is
129.696 (Table 7). This is significantly lower than both the competitive
norm and the estimated asymptote in the CS market (155.282), but sig-
nificantly higher than the estimated asymptote in the DS market
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(108.918) (α = 0.05, Tables 7 and 4.1). The seller earnings in the DS5
market converged from below (from 100.434 to 129.696).
According to the estimated asymptote, buyer earnings exceed seller
earnings by 19.641 in the DS5 market (Table 7). This is significantly
different from the competitive norm and also from the estimated
Table 7. Estimated Asymptotes and Starting Values for Selected Treatments.
Centralized Spot (CS)
Variable
Asymptote Starting value
Price 81.399 a* 78.708
Quantity Traded 21.316 a 21.922
Total Earning 1183.159 a 1171.344
Buyer Earnings 141.609 a 159.302
Seller Earnings 155.282 a 132.584
Buyer/Seller Earnings Difference –12.128 a 18.700
Decentralized Spot with 3 matched pairs (DS)
Variable
Asymptote Starting value
Price 74.459 b 73.835
Quantity Traded 16.416 b 16.801
Total Earning 1050.440 b 968.600
Buyer Earnings 153.653 b 152.578
Seller Earnings 108.918 b 88.352
Buyer/Seller Earnings Difference 43.393 b 69.429
Decentralized Spot with 5 matched pairs (DS5)
Variable
Asymptote Starting value
Price 77.609 c 72.528
Quantity Traded 17.111 c 17.288
Total Earning 1095.381 c 1093.108
Buyer Earnings 145.272 a 170.835
Seller Earnings 129.696 c 100.434
Buyer/Seller Earnings Difference 19.641 c 55.733
*a,b,c — same letter indicates no significant difference between estimated asymptotes in the
respective equations. A different letter indicates a significant difference between estimated
asymptotes, α = 0.05.
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asymptotes of buyer/seller earnings difference in both the DS and
CS markets (43.393 and –12.128, respectively) (α = 0.05, Tables 7
and 4.1). Comparison with the estimated starting value suggests that
the buyer/seller earnings difference decreased to the end of the con-
vergence process.
The above analyses suggest that as a result of the increased number of
available bargaining matches in a trading cycle of the decentralized spot
market both average trade price and quantity traded increased, as com-
pared to those in the decentralized spot market with three available
matches in a trading cycle. The increased quantity traded resulted in in-
creased total earnings in the decentralized spot market with five bar-
gaining matches. As a result of the higher average price, the difference
between the average buyer and seller earnings decreased, although
buyer earnings are still significantly higher than seller earnings. However,
both average price and quantity traded in the decentralized spot market
with five available bargaining matches in a trading cycle is still signifi-
cantly lower than in the centralized spot market. As a result, total earn-
ings in the decentralized spot market with five matches is lower than in
the centralized market, and the distribution of earnings between buyers
and sellers in the former market is still further from the competitive opti-
mum than in the latter market.
5. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
This study addresses two issues of importance in the evolving market
economy of Russia. One, we address the impacts of private negotiation
(decentralized) trading versus double auction (centralized) trading in for-
ward and spot deliveries. Two, the impacts of price reports in a decen-
tralized spot market are investigated. The former is important because
most trading in the food sector of Russia is via private negotiation, as
centralized markets have been slow to develop in this sector. Also, there
is little forward delivery, due to uncertainty and an inadequate legal sys-
tem to enforce contracts. Delivery, therefore, is necessarily spot, i.e.,
goods are produced in advance of sale.
The bilateral monopoly theoretical model provides a reasonable predic-
tion of behavior in private negotiation trading. Mainly because quantities
traded are lower relative to the competitive prediction, private negotiation
trading results in reduced total surplus by 16% and 12% in forward and
spot deliveries, respectively. Prices are near the competitive level when
buyers and sellers have equal bargaining power (forward delivery), how-
ever, erode in the case of spot delivery.
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We proposed that buyers benefit through increased bargaining power in
private negotiation trading with spot delivery, leading to reduced prices
and quantities traded. Advance production and a finite number of
matches gives buyers monopsony power at the end of a trading cycle
that can be carried forward into earlier bargaining sessions. The labora-
tory results suggest that private negotiation trading and spot delivery can
reduce units traded by 25%, trade prices by about 9%, relative to the
competitive equilibrium. Privately negotiated spot prices are significantly
different than forward prices, and about 7% lower. At the same time, pri-
vately negotiated spot prices are not as low as the monopsony solution
because of the matching risk buyers face in the latter bargaining ses-
sions when there are three bargaining matches in a trading cycle. Nev-
ertheless, seller earnings in the private negotiation spot market are only
2/3 of buyer earnings, and are 19% lower than in the case of forward
delivery. Compared to a spot auction setting, seller earnings are reduced
by nearly 30%. Hence, for the same basic supply and demand condi-
tions, seller earnings could rise by more than 40% if trading switched
from private negotiation to a double auction. Total surplus in this market
would increase by 13%.
Privately negotiated trades carry transactions costs. An auction environ-
ment does better in generating surplus for agents primarily because
more units are sold. Compared to private negotiation trading, auctions
are "matching rich." In a four-and-a-half minute trading period, our pri-
vate negotiation treatments allowed three matches. In a double auction
the four-and-a-half minute trading period allowed continuous matching
between buyers and sellers, because the four buyers and four sellers in
the market all took part in the negotiation. Effectively, there is more bid-
ding competition in auction trading than in private negotiation trading.
Private negotiation can make poor matches in the second and third one-
and-a-half minute bargaining rounds. In these rounds a single seller may
have moved up the cost schedule and a single buyer may have moved
down the redemption schedule sufficiently far enough that there is very
little or no motivation for trading. Additionally, in spot delivery incentives
can be exhausted in later rounds. In any case, these matches can be
poor, and poor matches restrict trading in the overall market. The pairing
of agents creates a transaction cost in the market. Valuable negotiating
time is wasted that would not be in a double auction.
A related perspective suggests that compared to private negotiation
trading, double auction markets are information rich. Buyers and sellers
are instantly informed of when trades are made and the trade price. In-
formation is public. Private negotiation restricts such information to the
paired buyer and seller making the trade. Learning about the market is
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confined, and never as extensive as it is in an auction. In transacting with
one other agent there is no knowledge of the costs and demands of
other traders that may create a "better match," which we define as a
trade that generates more surplus between the buyer and seller.
It is often claimed that private negotiation markets can be made more
like the information-rich double auction through providing market partici-
pants with additional information about the market, especially, with mar-
ket prices. We argued that providing agents with additional information
about market price cannot improve the bargaining position of sellers in
decentralized trading and spot delivery, hence, it would not make the
private negotiation spot market more competitive. This was supported by
the results obtained in our experiments. Alternative types of information
in private negotiation trading with spot delivery, as provided in our ex-
periments, do not improve the seller's bargaining position for price and
in some cases appear to improve the bargaining position of buyers, rela-
tive to that of sellers, putting sellers in a worse position.
Analyses of the laboratory data suggest that sellers adjusted their pro-
duction decision according to the additionally provided price information,
so that the reported price would be a little higher than their marginal
production cost. Besides, both sellers and buyers used the information
to form their price expectations in the following trading cycles. Buyer
market power resulted in reported prices being considered as the upper
rather than average price level in the following cycles. When market
agents were provided with average price in the decentralized spot mar-
ket, which tends to the monopsony level, a risk averse seller reduced
his/her production relative to the monopsony level price, in order to
avoid the situation in which the marginal unit has to be sold at a loss. A
buyer, however, maximizing his/her profit responded to the quantity re-
duction by a further decrease in price (went down the cost schedule). As
a result, less quantity was sold and for a lower price.
On the other hand, when prices from the competitive centralized market
were reported, a producer responded with increased production and this
also resulted in a loss. A buyer does not have an incentive to buy the
quantity that exceeds the optimum monopsony level at a price that would
cover the production costs because the buyer would not benefit from
that decision. Instead, the buyer uses his/her market power and forces
the seller to accept a lower price. The seller will do this because he/she
would lose all production costs for the extra units, if the lower price of-
fered by the buyer was not accepted. The producer-seller loses again.
Seller earnings are significantly lower in each of the information treat-
ments, relative to the no information (DS) treatment. Thus, the addition-
ally provided market price information could hardly make producers
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better off and, since quantity produced could be decreased, market effi-
ciency would be reduced.
In competitive auction trading in which neither the agents nor the goods
being traded have any distinguishing characteristics, the market estab-
lishes a clearing price. The clearing price is usually near the predicted
competitive equilibrium. Most transactions in this market setting also are
completed at or near that price, when agents are given the opportunity
to learn. These results change when sellers produce a non-storable
product in advance of sale, and buyers and sellers individually negotiate
for price during random pairings. Results from our experiments indicate
a tendency for sellers to be disadvantaged relative to buyers in their ne-
gotiation for price. Moreover, information treatments provided in our ex-
periments do not improve the seller's position, and in some cases make
it worse. There is evidence of a "curse of knowledge" for sellers in our
information experiments in their negotiation for price, particularly when
quantity is implicitly reported (DS/TP), relative to no information.
Centralized trading, as compared to decentralized trading, offers more
than an information advantage to agents. It solves the matching problem
that exists in private negotiation trading, effectively matching buyers and
sellers so that total surplus can be maximized. Price in centralized trad-
ing responds to levels of production, whereas in decentralized trading
prices tend to be more related to the relative bargaining strengths of
buyers and sellers. For example, we noted in our private negotiation ex-
periments that price did not increase, even when production levels de-
clined. However, private negotiation market outcomes move closer to
those of the double auction when the number of available bargaining
matches increased. The price increase in the market with five trading
matches could be attributable to the following: (1) the end-of-period
matching risk for a buyer becomes higher when the number of matches
increase, (2) sellers have more options and can be more patient in an
attempt to find the best match. Evidently, the increased number of avail-
able matches brings more competition, through additional options, to the
decentralized spot market and this improves the bargaining position of
sellers. As a result, buyers bid more and sellers responded with higher
production.
These results provide us with implications for advancing the efficiency of
markets in Russia and in understanding why market structures have
evolved as they have. The key to providing more efficient markets domi-
nated by decentralized trading and spot delivery is to provide means to
strengthen the bargaining position of sellers. How might this be done?
We have seen that centralized trading improves the competitive environ-
ment. The bargaining position of the sellers also is certainly improved
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when they use forward instead of spot delivery in decentralized trading.
In the experiments, market outcomes are also improved as the number
of available trading matches increases, even given the same number of
agents. This suggests that decentralized trading through computer net-
works that increases number of potential traders could have a potential
in the Russian food market.
Another way to increase the number of available trading matches would
be to let intermediaries enter the market. The buyers in our experiments
were limited in number. The returns to these few buyers, in fact, acting
as intermediaries, are such to entice other intermediaries into the mar-
ket. Additional intermediaries in the market results in more competition
and could provide sellers with more alternatives, although likely increas-
ing their searching and matching costs. Spulber (1999) maintains that as
the number of intermediaries increases, prices evolve to the competitive
norm. But, intermediaries also add to the costs in the marketing chain.
These costs force firms to search for means of coordinating to reduce
the costs of transacting. This is likely why we see vertical integration in
the Russian food sector, dampening the development of centralized
trading. Cooperatives also provide producers in the Russian agricultural
sector with the advantage of improving their bargaining position. Each of
these implications provides the focus for additional research directed to-
ward improving the efficiency of markets in Russia.
Decentralized markets in a real-world economy are obviously much more
complicated than those considered in this study. One important mecha-
nism that may greatly affect market outcomes is reputation. A related
mechanism is a trust between trading partners, which also may affect
price-quantity patterns; thus, influencing market efficiency. Applying dif-
ferent search mechanisms in private negotiation trading also may influ-
ence market outcomes. Each of these additions to the relatively simple
experimental market used in our work needs a separate set of experi-
ments to maintain the control that is necessary in economic experiments.
Another area for future research is an investigation of the effects of
agents' expected prices on their decision processes, when alternative
market information scenarios are presented. Such an analysis may show
that it is not additional information by itself that is detrimental in improv-
ing market efficiency in private negotiation spot trading, but how it is
perceived and processed by agents. This study provides the baseline for
these possible extensions in future research.
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APPENDICES
A1. Economic Models
Two approaches are used to develop the economic models that follow.
They are the price theory and game theory approaches. We believe that
they complement each other and together give a better understanding of
the markets under investigation.
Price Theory Approach. The salient features of the economic setting
under investigation are the effects of risks inherent in alternative mecha-
nisms for price discovery. The expected value-variance (EV) approach
(Robison and Barry, 1987) is used to model the effects of price risk due
to the information differences in centralized and decentralized markets
and also risk resulting from spot trading. Risk may be incorporated into
an EV model by generally assigning random variables to prices (in our
case) and forming the certainty equivalent of the profit expression.
Spot-Centralized Market. The spot market, by definition, occurs after
the production decision. Costs become sunk. Thus, there is the possibil-
ity for the seller to lose all, or part of, the cost of production, because a
unit might not be sold at a price equal to or greater than unit cost. Ef-
fectively, this is a risk associated with price in the spot market. Expected
price therefore is E(p + w) = p, where w is a normally distributed random
variable with expected value zero and variance σ 2w . The distribution of w
is assumed to be such that price cannot be negative. Following Robison
and Barry (1987), the certainty equivalent of the profit expression for the
seller is
πce = pq – C(q) – 
λ
2
s (q2 σ 2w ), (1)
where C(q) is total cost, q is units produced, and λs is the Pratt – Arrow
measure of risk attitude for the seller. The first order conditions require
p = C′(q) + λs qσ 2w . (2)
As a buyer does not have to incur sunk cost before purchases, the first
order conditions in the buyer case require
R′(q) = p, (3)
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where R(q) is total revenue.
The additional cost associated with the price risk from advance produc-
tion in a spot market should result in reduced quantity for the risk averse
seller (λs > 0), as compared to when this risk is not present. Similarly,
price is expected to be higher in a spot market than that predicted by
the competitive equilibrium model in the absence of price risk due to
production before sale (Krogmeier et al., 1996). More intuitively, the
supply curve in the case of a spot market shifts to the left of that in the
competitive equilibrium model.
Spot-Decentralized Market. We have argued previously that price in-
formation available to agents in a decentralized market is less than in a
centralized market due to the decreased interaction of sellers and buy-
ers. This contributes to the uncertainty in the market. We can model this
by assigning a normally distributed random variable (ε) to price (p) in
both the cases of the seller and buyer. The expected value of ε is as-
sumed to be zero with variance of εσ
2 . Again, we assume the distribution
is such that price cannot be negative. In this case, because there is only
one buyer and one seller, bilateral monopoly, price also is a function of
q. The expected price for the seller in a spot market is E(p + w + ε) = p.
The certainty equivalent of the profit expression for the seller is
πce = p(q)q – C(q) – 
λ
2
s (q2σ 2w  + q2 εσ
2  + 2q2 ρσwσε), (4)
where ρ is the correlation between w and ε. The first order condition for
the seller requires
p′(q)q + p(q) =  C′(q) + λs (qσ 2w  + q εσ 2  + 2 εσ 2 ) (5)
The certainty equivalent of the buyer's profit expression is
πce = R (q) – p(q) − 
λ
2
b (q2 εσ
2 ). (6)
The first order conditions for the buyer require
R′(q) = p′(q)q + p(q) + λb (q εσ 2 ) (7)
Both buyers and sellers incur risk due to the added cost of information
loss in private negotiation relative to centralized auction markets. The
seller also has the additional cost of price risk associated with possible
inventory loss resulting from production before sale. The quantity traded
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in this scenario is expected to decline, and total surplus, and thus mar-
ket efficiency, will be reduced relative to the control case. The impact of
private negotiation (decentralized market) on price is uncertain from the
model. The negotiated price will depend on the relative risk preferences
of the buyer and seller and also on differences in the variances of price
risk attributable to both production before sale for the seller and infor-
mation for both the seller and buyer. Consistent with Buccola (1985),
price variance in decentralized markets is expected to be greater than in
centralized markets.
The bilateral monopoly theoretical construct provides a starting point to
predict behavior of agents in private negotiation. The risk of no exchange
and the incentive of buyers and sellers to maximize earnings from trades
provide the course of action for strategic behavior. In the absence of in-
formation asymmetry and other extraneous forces, such as signaling or
communication, bids and offers, and reaction to those bids and offers,
provide the information to agents for their strategic behavior. Buyer
power and seller power will tend to counteract each other. This does not
mean that prices necessarily will end up at the competitive auction equi-
librium. Bargaining expertise, relative risk preferences, and strategic be-
havior impact the final outcome. Moreover, repeated negotiations and
random matches of buyer-seller pairs, as in our experiments, also affects
behavior. Any buyer advantage will push price closer to seller marginal
cost, and seller advantage will push price closer to buyer marginal value.
The added risk for sellers due to advance production could be expected
to put them at a disadvantage to buyers in the spot decentralized mar-
ket. This could be expected to push price closer to the seller marginal
cost in our spot private negotiation trading.
The economic models developed to this point use price theory as their
foundation and offer advantages in that they explicitly consider risks as-
sociated with advance production and reduced information available to
agents in decentralized trading. Our primary focus has been on market
outcomes when individual buyers and sellers are transacting bilaterally,
as compared to behavior in centralized trading. This theoretical devel-
opment, however, does not offer sharp predictions of economic out-
comes in the case of private negotiation. We now turn to an alternative
theory, namely game theory, which might provide alternative predictions
as useful points of reference to which the results of the laboratory ex-
periments can be compared.
Game Theory. Very few game-theory models of the double auction ex-
ist, because of the difficulties of modeling strategic behavior on both
sides of the market. As a result, there is no generally accepted theoreti-
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cal model of the double auction (centralized trading). To model the oral
double auction, with the bids and offers openly called, is still more diffi-
cult because the process takes place over time and agents do not know
what prices will be available if they wait instead of trading now (McAfee
and McMillan, 1987). Friedman (1984) suggests an approach based on a
no-congestion equilibrium concept which uses a hypothetical extra
chance game appended to the double auction game. He suggests that if
there are three or more traders in a double auction market, and each
trader's actions at each time are chosen to maximize expected utility of
final holdings (given information currently available to him, his current
holdings, and the double auction rules), and the strategy selection re-
sults in a no-congestion equilibrium; then the outcome of trading con-
stitutes a price equilibrium. The final holdings are Pareto optimal, and
closing market bid and ask prices coincide and support the final hold-
ings. Friedman shows that the outcome is a Walrasian equilibrium.
A private negotiations market could be seen as a sequence of bilateral
bargaining. (In the proposed experiment each of the four buyers and
each of the four sellers is involved in three, or five in the DS5 treatment,
sets of bilateral bargaining with a randomly matched partner. No resale
is permitted.) Bilateral bargaining, perhaps, is the most primitive and
widely used trading institution. Despite its simplicity, unstructured bilat-
eral bargaining is difficult to analyze, because it occurs in a free-form
context, with no restriction on which party makes the first or any subse-
quent offer. Either party can terminate the bargaining by accepting the
current proposal of the offer (Davis and Holt, 1993).
To characterize an equilibrium under bilateral bargaining we follow the
approach offered by Gibbons (1992). As the dynamics of the unstruc-
tured bargaining seems impossible to formalize, we will consider a static
Bayesian game. Let the valuation for a unit be v (value) for the buyer and
c (cost) for the seller. These valuations are private information and are
drawn from independent distributions V and C, respectively. If the buyer
gets the unit for price p, then the buyer's utility9 is (v – p); if there is no
trade, then the buyer's utility is zero. If the seller sells the good for price
p, then the seller's utility is (p – c); if there is no trade, then the seller's
utility is (–c) due to the advance production. We analyze the following
trading game: the seller chooses the lowest price ps he is willing to ac-
cept for the unit, and the buyer simultaneously chooses the highest pb
he is willing to pay for the unit. (Hence, we omit the dynamics of the ne-
gotiation by introducing these reservation prices.) A trade occurs if
pb ≥ ps and we assume that the transaction price will be p = (pb + ps)/2,
                                               
9 This is the change in the buyer’s total utility.
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i.e., as a result of negotiations the parties split the difference (pb – ps)
equally. In the case of no trade the parties start new games with other
random partners.
In this game G, a strategy for the buyer is a function −1 1( ; ,..., )Gb b bp v p p
specifying the reservation price the buyer will choose depending on the
value and the prices paid in previous games. Likewise, a strategy for the
seller is a function −1 1( ; ,..., )Gs s sp c p p  specifying the reservation price the
seller will choose depending on the cost and the prices received in pre-
vious games. A pair of strategies (pb, ps) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if the following two conditions hold. For each v ∈ V, −1 1( ; ,..., )Gb b bp v p p
solves
{ }
1 1 1 1
1 -1
( ; , ..., ) ( ; , ..., )
max
2
Prob ( , , , ) ,
b
G G
b s s s b s s s
p
G
b s s s
p E p c p p p p c p p
v
p p c p p
− −  + ≥   
− ×   
× ≥ … (8)
where E[ps(c; 1sp , ..., 1−Gsp )pb ≥ ps(c; 1sp , ..., 1−Gsp )] is the seller's ex-
pected reservation price, conditional on the seller's reservation price
being less than the buyer's reservation price.
For each c ∈ C, ps(c; 
1
sp , ..., 
1−G
sp ) solves
{ }
1 1 1 1
1 -1
( ; , ..., ) ( ; , ..., )
max
2
Prob ( ; ,..., ) ,
s
G G
s b b b b sb b
p
G
b b sb
p E p v p p p v p p p
c
p v p p p
− −  + ≥   
− ×   
× ≥ (9)
where E[pb(v; 1bp ,..., 1−Gbp )pb(v; 1bp , ..., 1−Gbp ) ≥ ps] is the buyer's ex-
pected reservation price, conditional on the buyer's reservation price
being greater than the seller's reservation price.
There are many Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game. The number of
equilibria also is increased by the presence of the sunk production cost
in spot delivery, because a seller may have to accept a price less than
his cost, which would never be the case in a forward market situation.
The availability of the outside options represented with prices the parties
agreed upon in other games, however, narrows the range of possible
equilibria as compared with the case of "pure" bilateral bargaining. In
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the case of the transparent market (where information from previous
trades in the market is made available prior to bilaterally negotiating for
price), the range of possible equilibria may be narrowed even more as
strategies of both buyer and seller would be dependent on the reported
market price: pb(v; 
1
bp , ..., 
1−G
bp ; pm) and ps(c; 
1
sp , ..., 
1−G
sp ; pm), re-
spectively, where pm is the reported market price.
The suggested model still cannot determine the exact market outcomes
in the case of the private negotiations as compared with the centralized
market; both designed as spot trading. However, it can be argued that
the buyer is in a stronger bargaining position than the seller in a dyadic
negotiation of prices in spot trading.10 A buyer may understand that the
seller has the risk of losing the cost of production if units are not sold.11
This puts the seller at a decisive disadvantage to the buyer in the nego-
tiation process and forces the seller to accept lower bids from the buyer,
even for the reduced quantities produced. Buyers may not be willing to
bid prices up to receive a greater quantity if they can achieve gains from
lower prices on fewer units to offset unrealized gains from trading more
units. We might, therefore, expect prices in decentralized spot markets
to be less than those in centralized spot markets. Total surpluses also
are expected to be less. The more competitive nature of centralized spot
markets, i.e., the interaction of many buyers and sellers, tends to miti-
gate the stronger bargaining position the buyer has in decentralized spot
markets.
A2. An Example of the Experiment Instructions —
Private Negotiation (Decentralized) Spot Market
Introduction. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision
making. In this experiment, we will set up a market in which some of you
                                               
10 If we model the profit objective of an advance production (spot) seller, it must
hold that the quantity in stock (qm) is greater than or equal to the amount sold
(qs). So the seller faces a constraint in a Lagrangian objective that we write as
λ(qm – qs) ≥ 0, where the multiplier λ in the first order condition is the marginal in-
ventory cost; it effectively shifts a comparable forward or production-to-demand
supply curve to the left. Thus, spot costs are never lower than costs in the pro-
duction-to-demand institution. The impact of the inventory cost on trading prices
is an empirical question. Over time, however, we would expect sellers to learn
about the equilibrium quantity and prices in a spot market to adjust production
accordingly. Left over stock should decline, and we therefore expect λ to decline.
11 If a buyer fails to purchase a unit, he earns zero; if a seller fails to sell a pro-
duced unit, he loses the cost of production.
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will be BUYERS and some of you will be SELLERS. You have been pro-
vided with either BUYER RECORD SHEETS or SELLER RECORD SHEETS.
The sheets you have received designate whether you are a buyer or a
seller in this experiment. These record sheets will be used for the pur-
pose of illustration only. You will receive actual record sheets just prior to
the beginning of the actual experiment.
The commodity you are trading is referred to as a "unit". Sellers make
earnings by producing units at a cost and selling these units to buyers.
Buyers make earnings by purchasing units from sellers and then re-
deeming (or reselling) these units to the experimenter. Earnings are re-
corded in a fictitious currency called tokens. Tokens are exchanged for
cash at the rate of 35 tokens = 1 rubles. Your earnings will be paid to
you in CASH at the end of the experiment. To begin, every seller and
buyer will be given an initial balance of 700 tokens (20 rubles). You
may keep this money PLUS any you earn.
Buyers and sellers will be randomly paired and will exchange units for
tokens in a computerized market or auction over a sequence of trading
periods. Each trading period consists of three trading sessions during
which pairs of buyers and sellers negotiate trading prices. The organiza-
tion of a trading period is depicted below in Fig. 3. Each trading period
consists of a production decision and trading sessions. During the pro-
duction period, sellers decide on the number of units to produce for the
trading period. Any units produced are then available to sell in the three
trading sessions. Meanwhile, during the production decision buyers are
 
 
TRADING 
SESSIONS 
WAIT 
PRODUCE 
UNITS 
BUYERS: 
SELLERS: 
PRODUCTION DESICION 
Fig. 3. Organization of Trading Period. 
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waiting for the trading to begin. Trading, therefore, occurs after sellers
have produced units. Sellers have units ready (or "in stock") to be sold.
We have provided example computer screens for buyers and sellers
during this phase of the trading period. Unit values are exhibited for the
buyers and sellers to see their unit costs. (Unit values and unit costs are
discussed later.) The seller makes the production decision by clicking on
the arrows in the upper left corner of their respective screens using the
computer mouse. The production decision amount is then displayed in
the "Number Produced" box on the screen. Sellers also see unit costs
and total costs of units produced. Both buyers and sellers simply click
on "OK" when they are ready to move to the next phase of the experi-
ment.
Specific Instructions to Buyers. If you have been designated as a
buyer, please refer to your BUYER RECORD SHEET for practice pe-
riod 1. Remember, the values on this sheet are hypothetical. You will re-
ceive actual record sheets (with values for the experiment) after the
practice trading period.
During each trading period you are free to purchase up to 8 units in
the trading. For the first unit that you buy, you will receive the amount
listed under VALUE for Unit 1. In this example, this amount is 529 tokens.
Unit 1's redemption value is 529 tokens. For the second unit that you
buy you will receive the amount listed under VALUE for Unit 2, which is
483 tokens. The redemption values for subsequent units are found in the
same way.
The earnings or profits from each unit that you purchase (which are
yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the value
and purchase price of the unit bought. That is,
Profit = Value – Price
Suppose, for example, that you buy 3 units in a trading period. If you pay
80 tokens for the first unit, 300 tokens for the second unit, and 300 to-
kens for the third, your earnings are:
Profit for Unit 1 = 529 – 80 = 449
Profit for Unit 2 = 483 – 300 = 183
Profit for Unit 3 = 431 – 300 = 131
Period Earnings = 449 + 183 + 131 = 763 tokens
There are blanks on the record sheet for recording the purchase price
and earnings of each unit that you may purchase. The purchase prices
and earnings, from the above example, have been recorded in the ap-
propriate spaces. During the experiment you may record this information
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as you purchase units OR you may wait until the end of the trading pe-
riod when this information will be summarized on your computer screen.
We recommend the latter as trading occurs rapidly. Buyers also should
be aware that they will not be allowed to spend more tokens buying units
than what they have in their beginning balance in any one period.
Specific Instructions to Sellers. If you have been designated as a
seller, please refer to your SELLER RECORD SHEET for practice pe-
riod 1. Remember, the costs on this sheet are hypothetical. You will re-
ceive actual record sheets (with costs for the experiment) after the prac-
tice cycle.
During each trading period you are free to produce and sell up to 8
units. The first unit that you produce during a trading period will cost you
the amount listed under COST for Unit 1. In this example, this cost is 71
tokens. Unit 1's cost is 71 tokens. The second unit that you produce will
cost you the amount listed under COST for Unit 2, which is 117 tokens.
The unit costs for subsequent units are found in the same way.
The earnings or profits from each unit that you produce and sell (which
are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the
sale price and unit cost of the unit sold. That is,
Profit = Price – Cost
Suppose, for example, that you produce 3 units. You would then have
Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3 to sell in the spot market. Be aware that if you
sold only 2 units in the auction, in other words you failed to sell Unit 3,
you would still incur the cost of producing Unit 3. If this were the case,
your unit earnings for Unit 3 would be —169 tokens (i.e., your unit earn-
ings for Unit 3 would be negative).
Let's, however, suppose that you do sell all 3 units at the following
prices: Unit 1 for 80 tokens, Unit 2 for 300 tokens, and Unit 3 for 300 to-
kens. Your earnings would then be:
Profit for Unit 1 = 80 – 71 = 9
Profit for Unit 2 = 300 – 117 = 183
Profit for Unit 3 = 300 – 169 = 131
Total Earnings = 9 + 183 + 131 = 323 tokens
There are blanks on the record sheet for recording the sale price and
unit earnings of each unit that you may produce and sell. The sale prices
and earnings from the above example have been recorded in the appro-
priate spaces. During the experiment you may record this information as
you sell units OR you may wait until the end of the period when this
trading information will be summarized on your computer screen. Again,
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we recommend the latter. Sellers also should be aware that they will not
be allowed to incur a production cost greater than the amount in their
beginning token balance in any one trading period.
Trading Rules. Only one unit may be bought and sold at a time. A buyer
makes bids to the seller to purchase a unit. A "bid" is a proposed price
at which a buyer is willing to purchase a unit. Bids must become pro-
gressively higher. In other words, if the first bid for a unit is 100 tokens,
then the second bid must be higher than 100. Suppose the second bid is
120 tokens, then the third bid must be higher than 120, and so on. The
highest bid existing at any one time will be displayed on the computer
screen as the BID.
A seller makes offers to sell a unit. An "offer" is a proposed price at
which a seller is willing to sell a unit. Offers must become progressively
lower. In other words, if the first offer to sell a unit is for 200 tokens,
then the second offer must be lower than 200. Suppose the second offer
is 180 tokens, then the third offer must be less than 180, and so on. The
lowest offer existing at any one time will be displayed on the computer
screen as the OFFER.
There is one further set of restrictions on bids and offers. The reason for
these restrictions is just common sense. A buyer's bid cannot be higher
than the seller's OFFER. In other words, a buyer cannot attempt to pay a
price which is higher than that which the seller is willing to sell for. Simi-
larly, a seller's offer cannot be lower than the buyer's BID. In other
words, a seller cannot attempt to sell at a price below that which the
buyer is willing to pay.
A bid is made by typing the bid in the space labeled "Bid" on the com-
puter screen, and pressing the ENTER key. Similarly, an offer is made by
typing the offer in the space labeled "Offer" on the computer screen,
and pressing the ENTER key. During an auction, a buyer will be making
bids at the same time that a seller is making offers.
It should be apparent that the difference between the BID and the
OFFER gradually decreases. A trade is made when the BID equals the
OFFER. Suppose the BID is 150 tokens and the OFFER is 160 tokens. If
a buyer decided that he or she was willing to purchase the unit for 160
tokens, he or she could type the number 160 and then press ENTER.
There is, however, a quicker method to do this. As soon as the buyer
saw the OFFER was 160, he or she could simply clicking on the "Accept
Offer" box displayed at the bottom of the computer screen. Whenever a
buyer clicks on "Accept Offer", he or she automatically makes a bid
which equals the OFFER or, in other words, "accepts" the OFFER.
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As another example for sellers, suppose again that the BID is 150 and
the OFFER is 160. If a seller decided that he or she was willing to sell the
unit for 150 tokens, he or she could type the number 150 and then press
ENTER. Again, there is a quicker method to do this. As soon as the seller
saw the BID was 150, he or she could click on the "Accept Bid" dis-
played on the computer screen. Whenever a seller clicks on "Accept
Bid", he or she automatically makes an offer which equals the BID or, in
other words, "accepts" the BID.
After a seller and buyer have made a trade, the trade price will be dis-
played and each move to the next unit, which will be highlighted in yel-
low. After a trade has been made, BID and OFFER values are cleared
from the screen. A buyer and seller pair may then resume entering bids
and offers for additional units. Trades are made between buyers and
seller pairs for one minute and one-half. After a minute and one-half has
elapsed, buyers and sellers are again randomly paired.
Each trading period has a maximum time limit of 4.5 minutes or three
one minute trading sessions. The time remaining in the session is pro-
vided in the "Clock" displayed in the top right corner of the screen. An
auction may be terminated sooner than this by a vote to stop trading by
either the buyer or the seller. In order to vote to stop trading, click on
"Vote to Stop".
At the end of every trading period, which includes three trading sessions,
the computer will automatically account for sales or purchases that you
have made and adjust your token balance accordingly. A listing of sales
or purchases you have made and your adjusted token total balance will
be displayed on your computer screen at the end of every period. After
you have viewed and recorded this information and click on "OK", a new
trading period with three trading sessions will begin. This experiment will
consist of approximately 15 to 20 trading periods. The trading period and
session numbers are provided in the top left corner of the computer
screen. We will conduct a practice run to familiarize you with the
mechanics of the computerized market before the actual experiment
begins.
Your Name and Identification Number. Before seeing the described
windows, the computer will ask for your name and identification number.
The bids and earnings of people in the experiment are confidential.
Please do not look at someone else's screen and do not speak to an-
other participant once the experiment begins. You may ask the experi-
menter questions at any time during the experiment. Are there any ques-
tions before we conduct the practice session?
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A3. Market Outcomes by Period for Selected Treatments
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Fig. 6. Total Earnings in Centralized and Decentralized Forward and Spot
Markets.
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Fig. 7. Average Seller Earnings in Centralized and Decentralized Forward and
Spot Markets.
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Fig. 8. Average Buyer Earnings in Centralized and Decentralized Forward and
Spot Markets.
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Fig. 9. Average Trade Prices in Decentralized Spot Markets with and without
Market News Service.
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Fig. 10. Average Quantity Traded in Decentralized Spot Markets with and
without Market News Service.
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Fig. 12. Average Seller Earnings in Decentralized Spot Markets with and
without Market News Service.
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Fig. 13. Average Buyer Earnings in Decentralized Markets with and without
Market News Service.
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Fig. 14. Average Market Price, Average Expected Buyer Price, and
Average Expected Seller Price in the Three Replications of the
Decentralized Spot Market (DS).
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Fig. 15. Average Market Price, Average Buyer Expected Price, and
Average Seller Expected Price in the Three Replications of the
Decentralized Spot Market with Decentralised Average Price Reports
(DS/DI).
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Average Quantity Produced
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Fig. 16. Average Quantity Produced by a Seller in Decentralized Spot
Markets.
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Fig. 17. Average Prices in Decentralized Spot Markets with 3 Matched Pairs
(DS) and 5 Matched Pairs (DS5).
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Average Quantity Traded
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Period
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Fig. 18. Average Quantity Traded in Decentralized Spot Markets with
3 Matched Pairs (DS) and 5 Matched Pairs (DS5).
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Fig. 19. Total Earnings in Decentralized Markets with 3 Matched Pairs (DS)
and 5 Matched Pairs (DS5).
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Average Seller Earnings)
Fig. 20. Average Seller Earnings in Decentralized Markets with 3 Matched
Pairs (DS) and 5 Matched Pairs (DS5).
140
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Period
DS
DS5
120
100
80
Average Buyer Earnings
180
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Period
DS
DS5
Fig. 21. Average Buyer Earnings in Decentralized Markets with 3 Matched
Pairs (DS) and 5 Matched Pairs (DS5).
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A4. Statistical Test Results
Table A4.1. Estimated Coefficients (Standard Errors) — Convergence Models for
Price, Quantities Traded, Total Earnings, Buyer Earnings, Seller Earning, and
Buyer/Seller Earnings Difference.
Forward Centralized
Forward
Decentralized
Spot Centralized
As Compared with Competitive NormVariable
Asymptote
Starting
point
Asymptote
Starting
point
Asymptote
Starting
point
Price
(CN** = 80)
R2  = 0.9999
–3.321*
(0.410)
1.218
(0.983)
0.920*
(0.303)
2.833*
(0.764)
1.399
(0.871)
–1.292
(1.138)
Quantity Traded
(CN = 20)
R2  = 0.9999
2.605*
(0.195)
–5.176*
(0.466)
–3.670*
(0.096)
–4.158*
(0.249)
1.316*
(0.184)
1.922*
(0.385)
Total Earning
(CN = 1200)
R2 = 0.9999
7.265
(5.295)
–191.209*
(12.646)
–144.743*
(4.818)
–138.77*
(13.441)
–16.841*
(6.225)
–28.656*
(9.479)
Buyer Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
16.320*
(1.975)
–31.407*
(4.214)
–21.122*
(1.121)
–28.39*
(3.034)
–8.391
(4.479)
9.302
(6.777)
Seller Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
–13.998*
(.381)
–18.447*
(5.061)
–14.955*
(1.660)
–6.916
(4.400)
5.282
(5.087)
–17.416*
(7.345)
Buyer/Seller
Earnings
Difference
(CN = 0)
R2 = 0.9831
31.533*
(4.298)
–18.625*
8.893)
–6.137*
(2.696)
–21.894*
(6.744)
–12.128
(9.504)
18.700
(14.044)
Spot Decentralized
Spot Decentralized/
Decentralized Price
Reports
Spot Decentralized/
Centralized Price
Reports
As Compared with Competitive Norm
Variable
Asymptote Starting
point
Asymptote Starting
point
Asymptote Starting
point
Price
(CN** = 80)
R2  = 0.9999
–5.541*
(0.405)
–6.165*
(0.987)
–6.585*
(0.709)
–7.733*
(1.179)
–15.720*
(0.603)
–10.936*
(1.430)
Quantity Traded
(CN = 20)
R2  = 0.9999
–3.584*
(0.161)
–3.199*
(0.397)
–5.778*
(0.174)
–5.029*
(0.320)
–3.879*
(0.191)
–1.177*
(0.492)
Total Earning
(CN = 1200)
R2 = 0.9999
–149.56*
(11.592)
–231.4*
(27.768)
–232.511*
(6.502)
–253.785*
(16.749)
–175.181*
(21.011)
–267.734*
(55.762)
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Spot Decentralized
Spot Decentralized/
Decentralized Price
Reports
Spot Decentralized/
Centralized Price
Reports
As Compared with Competitive Norm
Variable
Asymptote Starting
point
Asymptote Starting
point
Asymptote Starting
point
Buyer Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
3.653
(2.387)
2.578
(5.110)
–9.894*
(2.078)
5.408
(4.921)
42.593*
(3.354)
41.441*
(8.565)
Seller Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
–41.082*
(2.229)
–61.648*
(5.706)
–49.730*
(2.085)
–62.642*
(4.962)
–86.787*
(4.783)
–104.139*
(11.831)
Buyer/Seller
Earnings
Difference
(CN = 0)
R2 = 0.9831
43.393*
(3.415)
69.429*
(8.267)
41.927*
(4.270)
57.930*
(6.700)
131.520*
(6.879)
138.019*
(16.241)
Spot Decentralized/All Trade
Prices Reported
Spot Decentralized/
5 Matched Pairs
As Compared with Competitive Norm
Variable
Asymptote Starting point Asymptote Starting point
Price
(CN** = 80)
R2  = 0.9999
–12.270*
(0.524)
–9.628*
(1.299)
–2.391*
(0.881)
–7.472*
(1.989)
Quantity Traded
(CN = 20)
R2  = 0.9999
–6.817*
(0.319)
–2.639*
(0.740)
–2.889*
(0.129)
–2.712*
(0.336)
Total Earning
(CN = 1200)
R2 = 0.9999
–268.953*
(15.715)
–85.957*
(34.269)
–104.619*
(5.317)
–106.892*
(13.933)
Buyer Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
–7.160*
(3.013)
17.513*
(7.568)
–4.728
(3.217)
20.835*
(8.469)
Seller Earnings
(CN = 150)
R2 = 0.9999
–60.168*
(2.565)
–39.706*
(5.729)
–20.304*
(3.983)
–49.566*
(8.627)
Buyer/Seller
Earnings
Difference
(CN = 0)
R2 = 0.9831
52.210*
(3.886)
59.097*
(9.764)
19.641*
(7.009)
55.733*
(16.782)
* — significantly different from 0, α = 0.05;
** — Competitive Norm.
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Table A4.2. Estimated Coefficients (Standard Errors) — Models for Trade Price,
Seller Expected Price, and Buyer Expected Price.
Variable
Trade Price
(R2 = 0.9433)
Seller Expected
Price (R2 = 0.5312)
Buyer Expected
Price (R2 = 0.5084)
Intercept 62.71167*
(10.6395)
67.88941*
(9.3803)
58.09726*
(10.9247)
EPS** 0.26214*
(0.0805)
EPB –0.125*
(0.0540)
TPLAG 0.031917
(0.1134)
0.150269
(0.1222)
0.278934
(0.1424)
MPDUM –40.101*
(10.6528)
–26.227*
(10.1931)
–40.8736*
(13.2711)
MPEPS –0.49528*
(0.1031)
MPEPB –0.02963
(0.0796)
MPTPLAG 1.057827*
(0.1227)
0.306666*
(0.1339)
0.426021*
(0.1701)
* significantly different from 0, α = 0.05;
** EPS — Seller's Expected Price (average per period in a replication);
EPB — Buyer's Expected Price (average per period in a replication);
TPLAG — Previous Period Trade Price (average per period in a replication);
MPDUM — dummy for the DS/DI treatment;
MPEPS = EPS*MPDUM;
MPEPB = EPB*MPDUM;
MPTPLAG = TPLAG*MPDUM.
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A5. Pattern of Trades
Table A5.1. Percent Trades and Average Trade Prices for Each Bargaining Ses-
sion by Treatment Across Replications and Trading Cycles 11 – 15.
Percent Trades
Treatment
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5
DF 41.80 34.00 24.20
DS 38.35 32.66 28.99
DS/DI 41.75 27.26 30.99
DS/CI 48.50 23.60 27.90
DS/TP 43.23 25.05 31.72
DS5 38.08 22.96 20.26 7.68 11.02
Average Trade Price
Treatment
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5
DF 82.38 79.80 79.15
DS 76.78 74.75 70.42
DS/DI 76.34 77.07 70.84
DS/CI 61.54 67.53 65.18
DS/TP 69.55 67.65 63.77
DS5 78.19 80.76 80.95 77.61 66.48
A6. Price Variance
Table 6.1. Price Variance by Treatments and Replications.
PeriodTreatment and
replication 1 2 3 4 5
DS
1st rep. 194.94 218.40 157.09 139.75 245.57
2nd rep. 183.52 146.27 194.31 89.05 164.82
3d rep. 442.97 195.20 260.33 140.10 236.45
4th rep. 164.97 169.36 71.04 44.51 90.15
5th rep. 124.37 230.15 86.12 102.03 85.53
6th rep. 386.99 145.46 223.85 147.21 483.97
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PeriodTreatment and
replication 1 2 3 4 5
DS/DI
1st rep. 113.65 130.33 103.00 228.63 160.45
2nd rep. 112.91 129.83 101.30 73.50 65.30
3d rep. 445.69 683.26 668.20 591.07 603.56
4th rep. 110.88 110.93 136.93 298.28 153.13
5th rep. 143.65 219.56 166.64 284.99 468.10
6th rep. 143.36 150.06 170.02 149.16 52.81
DS/CI
1st rep. 206.06 171.51 242.25 123.72 97.11
2nd rep. 178.58 312.30 329.33 283.85 309.21
DS/TP
1st rep. 164.42 88.42 62.85 24.82 131.54
2nd rep. 109.29 110.02 298.30 131.06 148.45
3d rep. 70.70 128.78 66.02 214.97 244.40
PeriodTreatment and
replication 6 7 8 9 10
DS
1st rep. 246.88 185.04 167.32 166.77 201.36
2nd rep. 141.84 141.33 78.77 93.73 58.57
3d rep. 197.30 269.65 127.28 65.52 154.24
4th rep. 187.13 77.76 88.60 142.06 32.69
5th rep. 95.26 127.78 123.60 64.29 92.97
6th rep. 86.73 217.52 302.71 173.94 206.86
DS/DI
1st rep. 139.72 189.34 131.42 180.71 147.15
2nd rep. 72.31 109.65 29.76 157.98 20.72
3d rep. 829.60 691.96 625.63 276.29 882.06
4th rep. 285.58 131.21 158.03 195.31 195.94
5th rep. 205.74 189.86 141.40 405.26 592.57
6th rep. 218.50 267.19 258.08 114.17 272.42
DS/CI
1st rep. 162.78 183.53 106.02 207.13 77.93
2nd rep. 194.12 212.25 234.70 210.53 114.60
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PeriodTreatment and
replication 6 7 8 9 10
DS/TP
1st rep. 66.45 78.75 66.28 180.68 61.75
2nd rep. 112.98 82.38 94.73 141.90 74.74
3d rep. 190.84 214.92 296.93 155.26 108.87
PeriodTreatment and
replication 11 12 13 14 15
DS
1st rep. 146.87 145.31 110.77 163.21 136.01
2nd rep. 180.53 134.56 84.41 185.76 173.09
3d rep. 475.69 346.83 369.26 199.72 143.47
4th rep. 49.27 100.97 68.92 118.25 55.64
5th rep. 66.04 49.52 61.94 73.37 94.61
6th rep. 218.29 274.06 291.67 163.36 306.07
DS/DI
1st rep. 214.89 150.47 164.87 534.29 158.45
2nd rep. 37.09 49.73 60.99 37.24 19.44
3d rep. 699.50 680.00 508.66 501.81 313.50
4th rep. 160.27 224.87 239.63 270.12 207.76
5th rep. 347.13 214.55 227.02 115.98 142.00
6th rep. 211.93 108.53 346.29 362.38 58.50
DS/CI
1st rep. 309.83 229.24 165.60 83.12 36.26
2nd rep. 142.36 189.21 151.84 266.20 168.42
DS/TP
1st rep. 61.96 57.43 90.0 77.12 82.81
2nd rep. 125.04 66.93 93.96 70.84 52.03
3d rep. 345.17 447.66 276.02 175.70 226.18
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